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ABSTRACT 
 
 I examine how political geography affects firms’ cost of debt. Policy risk, measured by 
proximity to political power reflected in firms’ position in the country’s political map, is 
negatively related to corporate bond ratings and positively related to firms’ cost of debt. I find 
firms’ policy risk can be mitigated by engaging in corporate political strategies like making 
campaign contributions or lobbying. Consistent with the view that such political strategies 
effectively protect firms against uncertainty about future policies, I find policy risk has less of an 
impact on the cost of debt of firms that support more powerful and well-connected politicians in 
the legislative co-sponsorship network or that spend more money on lobbying. 
 Using a sample of state pension funds’ equity holdings, I find that state pension funds 
exhibit not only local bias but also bias towards politically connected stocks. These politically 
connected local firms held by state pension funds do not exhibit better performance compared 
with their local benchmarks not held by these funds before the holding period, and the 
overweighting of politically connected local firms is negatively related to pension fund returns. 
My results do not support the information advantage hypothesis that state pension funds exhibit 
overweighting of local firms because they have an information advantage about home-state 
firms. I further examine the factors that explain local bias from political perspectives. My results 
show that local bias is related to public policy integrity and local politicians’ congressional 
connections.  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Risk, Corporate Political Strategies, and the Cost of Debt 
“Too many corporations and organizations ignore political risks until it is too late. These risks 
are either assumed to occur rarely (or to someone else) or to be entirely unpredictable. In both 
cases nothing could be farther from the truth.” Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat (2009). 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
  In this paper, I investigate whether uncertainty induced by the dynamic nature of the 
political process, namely, domestic policy risk at the state-level, has an impact on firms’ cost of 
debt. The recent European debt crisis and downgrading of U.S. government debt are examples of 
the importance of political risk in global financial markets.
1
 This risk is driven by uncertainty 
regarding a government’s role in the economy and can range from unexpected changes in 
government regulations to outright expropriation of corporate assets. It can have a profound 
impact on a firm’s cost of capital. For instance, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) find that 
political risk can predict equity returns whereas Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010) show that firms in 
countries with higher political stability have a lower cost of debt.  
  Besides being exposed to international political risk, local firms are also exposed to risk 
arising from changes in domestic governmental regulations and policies. For instance, take the 
highly publicized and controversial automotive industry bailout in 2009 where many 
bondholders were affected by government interference in favor of the United Auto Workers 
                                                          
1
 As perceptions about European politicians’ inability to swiftly deal with the crisis have deteriorated, costs 
of bailouts arranged for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have kept increasing dramatically accompanied by 
downgrades by major ratings agencies like Moody’s and S&P (see Collignon, Esposito, and Lierse, 2011). On 
August 5, 2011, citing political uncertainties in the United States, S&P downgraded U.S. government debt stating, 
“More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American 
policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a 
degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 
2011.”(www.standardandpoors.com accessed on August 5, 2011). 
2 
 
(Blaylock, Edwards, Stanfield, 2012).
2
 Even though political uncertainties get partially resolved 
around presidential elections, they remain important after elections because taxes, deficits, 
government spending, financial regulations, and the economy in general are all affected by new 
legislation and political agenda changes. As a result, the uncertainty about the consequences of 
such policies is also likely to increase interest rate risk or credit risk, and consequently raise the 
borrowing costs of firms that are more susceptible to it.  
  In the U.S., the political map is very dynamic. After presidential, congressional and 
midterm elections, some states will become more while others will become less aligned with the 
presidential party.  The elected politicians in Congress who are aligned with the administration 
along party and ideological lines are more likely to have an influence on shaping the political 
agenda and on spearheading new legislative efforts that will advance the administration’s 
political plans. Thus firms located in states that have politically shifted closer to the president can 
be subject to the benefits and risks associated with proximity to political power. Predictably, 
when powerful politicians advance new pieces of legislation in Congress they will want to do so 
in a way that will benefit, or at least not do much harm to, the firms and industries in their own 
states, especially those that are connected with them. This implies that proximity to political 
power may result in more benefits (or at least less risk) for connected firms but also to greater 
exposure to risk for the remaining vast majority of firms that are not politically connected (see 
Kim, Pantzalis, and Park, 2012). This type of uncertainty injected into markets by politicians 
tends to linger on for long periods due to the very nature of the legislative process. It takes long 
time for many legislative efforts to evolve into final bills acceptable by a majority in both 
chambers of Congress and the president. The path to the final passage of a bill can cross the two 
chambers of Congress several times and may involve numerous amendments and alterations. 
                                                          
2
 Many sources attribute President Obama’s Ohio win to the auto bailout in the 2012 Presidential election. 
3 
 
Actually, very few bills introduced will ultimately become law, although uncertainty is injected 
into markets throughout the legislative process. This local legislative uncertainty or local policy 
risk can affect local firms’ cash flows, financing and investment decisions, and also cost of 
capital. In this study, I examine whether local policy risk can affect firms’ borrowing costs. I 
expect to find that policy risk plays an important role in the corporate bond market where 
investors are looking for steady cash flows and have much lower risk tolerance levels compared 
to equity investors, 
  Using the political alignment index (PAI) measure constructed by Kim et al. (2012) and 
also legislative intensity as proxies for policy risk, I test whether political uncertainty influences 
firms’ cost of debt in a sample of new corporate bond issues from 1984 to 2008.3 This measure 
exploits state-level exogenous variation in policy uncertainty during election cycles. I find a 
negative relation between local political uncertainty and Moody’s corporate bond ratings, 
suggesting that ratings agency might consider local political uncertainty as another source of 
credit risk. Likewise, my results also show that local political uncertainty is positively related to 
yield spreads and thus firms’ costs of debt after I control for default spread, which is a proxy for 
default risk or credit risk. 
  Though shifts in political power around presidential elections may be associated with a 
resolution of some uncertainty, my results suggest that they still result in a significant impact on 
the cost of debt, especially for bond issuers in states that are more aligned with the presidential 
party or in states that are exposed to more legislative uncertainties. As a further test to establish 
causality I examine the impact of the change in policy risk on the cost of debt in close 
Presidential elections. For firms headquartered in states with low policy risk before the election, 
                                                          
3
 Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2012) imply that proximity to political power might reflect exposure policy risk 
through examining stock returns.  
4 
 
but experience a positive policy risk shock post-election, I find a strong positive relation between 
the change in policy risk and the cost of debt. For firms operating in high policy risk states 
before the election, but experience a negative policy risk shock, I find that policy risk is related 
to yield spreads before, but not post-election.   
  As to provide further evidence linking policy risk to firms’ cost of debt, I examine bond 
maturity. If policy uncertainty increases in the long run, it should have a bigger impact on long 
maturities compared to short maturities due to increased interest rate risk. Consistent with this 
view, I find a negligible impact of policy risk on shorter maturity bonds, but economically large 
impact on long maturity bonds. I also examine time series bond returns and find similar 
evidence—policy risk is related to bond prices. 
  I next examine if firms can hedge against policy risk by adopting active corporate 
political strategies (i.e., making contributions to political action campaigns (PACs) and/or 
lobbying). Several recent papers suggest that firms’ political strategies aim at establishing 
political connections so that they can reap private benefits and lower exposure to policy risk.
4
 
Bondholders stand to ultimately gain from such strategies because bond values increase when 
firm risk decreases.  
  Consistent with the view that active corporate political strategies provide an effective 
means of hedging policy risk, I find that political uncertainty is positively and significantly 
related to yield spreads of firms that do not lobby and (or) contribute to PACs, but is 
                                                          
4
 For instance, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) document that in the event of bankruptcy politically 
connected firms are more likely to be bailed out than their non-connected peers. Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 
(2008) show that politically connected Brazilian firms can get long-term debt financing at lower costs because 
politicians have a strong influence on government-owned banks. In a study of newly privatized firms, Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar (2010) find that the cost of equity is much lower for firms with strong ties to political 
power. Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010) show that corporate lobbying activities can improve firms’ financial 
performance. Yu and Yu (2010) suggest that fraudulent firms are more likely to engage in lobbying and are less 
likely to be detected. Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011) show that during the recent financial crisis, the more a bank 
spent on lobbying the more bailout money it received from the U.S. government despite poor mortgage loan 
performance.  
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insignificant for PAC-contributing and lobbying firms. Furthermore, firms that support 
politicians with stronger and more powerful positions in Congress’ legislative co-sponsoring 
network (for example, socially-connected House and Senate members that are more likely to 
draft, gather support for, and pass new bills) have lower yield spreads. 
  Kim et al. (2012) show that political geography is related to equity returns and their 
findings suggest that local policy risk matters in the stock market. My study provides an essential 
extension by revisiting this issue in the setting of the credit markets. To the extent that 
government policies affect many aspects of the economy like interest rate and taxes which can 
immediately impact the credit market, the corporate bond market provides a better setting to 
examine the impact of local policy risk. The major participants in the bond market are local 
institutions like insurance companies and pension funds who are usually buy-and-hold investors 
and more concerned about long-term uncertainties than some equity investors or arbitrageurs.
 5
 
In addition, the illiquid nature of the corporate bond market (see Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011), 
makes a rather accurate forecast about the impact of expected policy changes imperative to 
bondholders. Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008) suggest that different from stocks where 
expectations are indirectly and often imperfectly reflected in realized returns, bond yield spreads 
directly reflect investors’ risk-return expectations. If bond investors perceive that expected 
changes in policy risk will affect their positions of reinvestment, liquidation, or interest (or 
principal) collection, such perceptions should be reflected in yield spreads.   
  Furthermore, while it is well known that the stock market has remained volatile over 
time, the recent 2008 financial turmoil has clearly illustrated that disruption in the bond market 
that includes many important large participants could introduce bigger threats to the economy. 
                                                          
5
 Jiang (2008) suggests that institutional investors account for 95 percent of bond investors. Massa, Yasuda, 
and Zhang (2013) imply that there is strong local bias in corporate bond holdings.  
6 
 
The crisis has raised significant concerns with regulators, issuers, and investors on the widening 
credit spreads and the volatility in the credit market. Hence, my study is economically 
meaningful and timely in many respects.   
  The first important contribution of my study is that it is the first to provide empirical 
evidence that local policy risk at the state level, is related to credit risk and should not be 
negligible in the local corporate bond market. Further, it is positively related to yield spread after 
I control for default risk and has bond pricing and diversification implications for both firms and 
investors. My finding that political uncertainty significantly impacts the cost of debt 
complements and extends those of the extant literature on corporate cost of debt.
6
 The study 
might be of particular interests to local institutional investors like pension funds, mutual funds, 
and insurance groups who invest heavily in the local corporate bond markets. 
  As many studies like Christensen (2008), Collin- Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), 
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), and Houweling, 
Mentink, and Vorst (2005) try to explain the credit spread puzzle, which is the wide gap between 
yield spread and default rate, through tax rate, liquidity risk, and other factors, the credit spread 
puzzle remains unsolved. One indirect implication of my findings related to the impact of policy 
uncertainties on yield spread and bond returns is that local policy risk might account for part of 
the missing piece in explaining the credit spread puzzle.
7
 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. I discuss literature background about policy 
risk at the state level and firms’ costs of debt in the next chapter. Chapter Three describes the 
                                                          
6
 The existing empirical literature has linked the corporate cost of debt to many other factors, such as 
default risk (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974), information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991; Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young, 2008), corporate governance (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 
2005; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007), founding family ownership (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003), among other 
factors. 
7
 Pastor and Veronesi (2013) find that political uncertainty can explain equity risk premium.  
7 
 
data. Chapter Four provides empirical evidence linking the cost of debt to policy risk. Chapter 
Five presents results on the impact of corporate political strategies on firms’ cost of debt 
followed by a conclusion in Chapter Six.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Background 
  Significant nation-wide policy changes can impact inflation, unemployment, trade, and 
other macroeconomic factors. Consequently, policy risk should be a paramount concern for 
many firms and industries (Cohen, Diether and Malloy, 2012). Different from many other 
countries, the US political map is redrawn every two years following Congressional elections in 
the United States. Shifts in political geography can expose firms to policy risk, i.e. uncertainty 
about the likelihood and nature of future policies or new legislation that may be initiated by the 
winning party and targeted toward the industry or geographic area a firm operates in. Kim, 
Pantzalis, and Park (2012) show that expected stock returns are higher for firms in states with 
greater proximity to political power, implying that shareholders’ financial claims are contingent 
on changes in firms’ geo-political environment. Their findings are also consistent with the 
literature on information risk which argues that investors’ expected returns are positively 
associated with the magnitude of information uncertainty (see Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Jiang, 
Lee, and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006). I conjecture that corporate debt markets also pay close 
attention to the political environment firms operate in and assign credit ratings and interest rates 
accordingly. 
  Several recent studies provide evidence of a strong relationship between political 
uncertainty and firms’ operating and financial performance. For example, Cohen, Coval, and 
Malloy (2011) show that fiscal spending shocks that lead to increases in federal spending seem 
to significantly dampen corporate investment and employment. Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
(2009) examine corporate boards’ political connectedness and find that the stock price response 
9 
 
to the Republican win of the 2000 presidential election was positive for companies connected to 
the Republican Party and negative for companies connected to the Democratic Party. Others 
(e.g., Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001) have argued that externalities, like a politician’s deteriorating 
health, sudden death or scandals can expose firms to political uncertainty too. For example, 
Faccio and Parsley (2009) find that after the death of a politician the value of firms 
headquartered in the politician’s home area decreases by 1.7%. These studies suggest that 
investors are not irresponsive to firms’ political environments, and thus firm value is infused 
with political uncertainty.  
  Uncertainty about future policies arising from shifts in political geography can affect a 
firm’s cost of debt through several channels. I argue that policy risk can influence firms’ 
investment decisions as well as investors’ perceptions about expected payoffs from investing in 
these firms. For example, bills related to monetary policy, tax rates, appropriation, immigration, 
et cetera can have direct impact on local firms and businesses. If future expected payoffs cannot 
be regarded as secure due to rising policy uncertainty associated with a geographical area, 
investors will demand higher compensation to bear the additional risk. Julio and Yook (2012) 
show that firms facing uncertainty surrounding political elections reduce their investment 
expenditures until the uncertainty is resolved. Kim et al. (2012) show that this effect extends 
beyond election cycles—firms located in areas where policy uncertainty is high choose to 
“downsize” until uncertainty about future policies impact on firms’ growth opportunities has 
abated. The aforementioned types of changes in firms’ investment policy do not occur as a 
consequence of normal business conditions and, as such, are less predictable and can affect 
investor perceptions about the firm’s cash flow volatilities. Consequently, if firms’ future cash 
flows are perceived to have become more volatile as a result of increasing levels of political 
10 
 
uncertainty, investors would require higher yields on corporate debt.
8
 My argument is also 
supported by Krueger and Walker (2008) and Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009).   
  Policy risk can also shape a firm’s information environment, which is an important 
ingredient in the quality of corporate governance and the effectiveness of external monitoring of 
managers. Within a large country like the U.S. with geo-politically segmented areas (i.e. U.S. 
states or regions),  it is conceivable that the information sets of investors can vary across 
different regions or states when political events and developments do not have a uniform impact 
on markets across different geographic locations. Thus, it is possible that in locations where the 
influence of politics is profound, local investors’ information sets can become distinct from the 
national norm (Aabo, Pantzalis and Park, 2012).
9
 From the perspective of non-local investors, 
monitoring managers of firms whose information environments are disproportionally infused by 
a local political information component is more difficult. It is therefore conceivable that 
relatively weaker non-local external monitoring may result in more pronounced agency costs 
between managers and debtholders in firms exposed to greater policy risk and, consequently, to 
higher borrowing costs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 From the perspective of agency costs of managerial behavior, Stulz (1990) argues that firm value is 
negatively related to cash flow volatility. Billet and Mauer (2003) suggest that cash flow volatility is positively 
associated with firms’ cost of debt. Dimitrov and Tice (2006) imply that cash flow volatility predicts the probability 
of default. 
9
 Aabo, Pantzalis and Park (2012) utilize two different empirical methodologies to show that the greater the 
importance of politics at the local level, the greater the local bias. Specifically, they find that the inverse relationship 
between stock prices and the ratio of aggregate book value of firms to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in a 
state (RATIO) is only prevalent among firms located in areas where politics has substantial influence on local 
markets. Moreover, it is the same types of firms that display greater local comovement. Their results imply that 
politics can cause domestic capital market segmentation leading to local bias. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Data and Variables 
  I obtain the sample of seasoned corporate bond issues by non-financial U.S. firms over 
the period November 1984 to October 2008 from the SDC Global New Issues database. I start 
with November and end in October in order to match election cycles. I follow Huang, Ritter, and 
Zhang (2012) and filter my sample to exclude exchangeable issues, floating rate issues, putable 
issues, perpetual issues, subordinated bond issues, and unit issues. I require that information like 
issue and maturity dates, yield to maturity, gross proceeds, and rating scores from Moody’s and 
S&P are available.
10
 I also exclude issues with gross proceeds lower than $5 million. I use 
comparable treasury yields from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) to compute yield 
spreads and Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond yields from FRED to compute the default 
spread. Stock returns are from CRSP and financial data are from COMPUSTAT. 
  Data on corporate PAC contributions and lobbying activities are collected from the 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). The lobbying data are available on CRP from 1998. They 
are more comprehensive after the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 that 
mandates lobbying registrants to file semi-annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives. My lobbying sample covers a nine-year period from 
November 2000 to October 2008. Both contribution activities and lobbying activities are 
                                                          
10
 My final sample size, despite the slightly different sample period, is similar to Huang, Ritter, and Zhang 
(2012). The exclusion of issues lacking ratings information might raise the concern of sample selection bias because 
my sample is dominated by large firms. However, most issuers tend to be large firms anyway. In addition, missing 
rating observations amount to less than 5% of my total sample. Specifically, there are only 238 bond issues (115 
issuers) that were not assigned with a Moody’s rating score at the time of the issue during my sample period. Of this, 
only 26 bond issues were issued for the period from 2000 to 2008, 10 of which were issued by a lobbying issuer.   
12 
 
aggregated at the parent-firm level. Data on politicians’ legislative co-sponsorship networks are 
gathered from James H. Fowler’s website.11 
  I use the Political Alignment Index (PAI) constructed by Kim et al. (2012) as one proxy 
for policy risk. PAI is a measure of firm proximity to political power as reflected in the degree of 
alignment of local (state or region) politicians with the President and his administration. The PAI 
index is constructed at the state level as follow:  
PAI = ¼ (SENATORS) + ¼ (REPRESENTATIVES) + ¼ (GOVERNOR) +  
  ¼ (½ (STATE SENATORS) + ½ (STATE REPRESENTATIVES))   (1) 
where SENATORS is the percentage of the two senators that belong to the President’s party. 
REPRESENTATIVES is the percentage of house representatives that belong to the President’s 
party. GOVERNOR is a dummy that equals one if the Governor is in the same party as the 
President, and zero otherwise. STATE SENATORS is a dummy that equals one if the percent of 
state senators in the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. STATE 
REPRESENTATIVES is a dummy that equals one if the percent of state house representatives in 
the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise.  
  Kim et al. (2012) show that proximity to political power exposes firms to policy risk. The 
rationale behind this effect is that states with stronger alignment with the President and his 
administration are more likely to be targeted during the legislation process, and thus exposed to 
more policy uncertainties. This is because, politicians from states with higher values of PAI will 
dominate senate and house committees in Congress and have much greater influence on setting 
the policy agenda as well as on passing new legislation. They will naturally be doing so with an 
                                                          
 
11
 I construct firm-level measures of the strength of corporations’ political networks based on whether they 
include politicians that are influential in passing legislation and part of the legislators’ cosponsorship network. The 
measures of cosponsorship network can be found at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.htm.  
 
13 
 
eye on their district and state constituents. Notably, it appears that political uncertainty may be 
partly traced back to political activities of corporations that become more connected or simply 
have better access to legislators in high PAI areas. In Table 1, I sort states into terciles based on 
the time-series change of the PAI index and compare federal legislative activities of politicians 
from these states that serve in the Senate and House chambers of the U.S. Congress. I find that 
politicians from states that become more aligned with the President’s party introduce and pass 
more bills in Congress.
12
 
Table 1: Change in the PAI Index and Legislative Activities 
 
This table reports legislative activities based on a tercile sort in the change in the political alignment index (ΔPAI) 
from time t-1 to time t. Legislative activities are measured as the number of bills introduced and passed by 
politicians from a particular state. BILLNUM is the number of bills that are introduced in Congress by politicians 
from a state in a given year, and PLAWNUM is the number of bills that eventually become law. P-values from tests 
on differences in means (or medians) are provided. The Wilcoxon test is conducted to test differences in medians. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
ΔPAI 
 
             BILLNUM               PLAWNUM 
Terciles N Mean Median Mean Median 
1 368 75.89 54.00 4.15 3.00 
2 432 82.85 58.00 5.06 3.00 
3 400 103.55 70.00 6.10 4.00 
(3)-(1) 
 
27.66*** 16.00*** 1.95*** 1.00*** 
p-value 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Table 2 presents industry and a state-level distribution of the PAI index, Moody’s and 
S&P corporate bond ratings, and yield spreads. In Panel A, I sort firms based on SICD, which is 
the first two digits of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Construction, mining, 
and services industries are exposed to more policy risk. Average yield spreads in these industries 
are also higher. Panel B presents means and medians of PAI, ratings, and yield spreads by state. 
Firms headquartered in four states (California, Illinois, New York, and Texas) represent about 
                                                          
12
 Note that the percentage of bills introduced that ultimately become law is roughly the same between low 
and high PAI states. For instance, in low PAI states approximately 5.5% (4.2 / 75.9) of bills that are introduced 
become law compared to 5.9% (6.1 / 103.6) in high PAI states.  
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1/3 of my bond sample.  In general, my results suggest higher yield spreads for states with a 
higher PAI index, though a few exceptions exist.  
Table 2: Industry and State-Level Distribution 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the PAI index, Moody’s credit ratings, S&P credit ratings, and yield spreads 
(%). Panel A reports an industry distribution and panel B reports state-level distribution characteristics. SICD is the 
first two digits of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  
 
Panel A: Industry distribution  
Industry Group SICD N PAI Index Moody's Ratings S&P Ratings Yield Spread (%) 
    
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 01- 09 9 0.51 0.51 3.22 2.00 3.33 3.00 2.78 3.16 
Mining 10 -14 309 0.53 0.50 3.52 4.00 3.58 4.00 2.34 2.07 
Construction 15 - 17 132 0.55 0.61 3.33 3.00 3.30 3.00 2.52 2.30 
Manufacturing 20 - 39 2,664 0.45 0.43 4.59 5.00 4.64 5.00 1.38 1.00 
Transportation, 
Communications 40 - 49 1,324 0.45 0.43 4.26 4.00 4.32 4.00 1.76 1.36 
Wholesale Trade 50 - 51 147 0.48 0.41 4.03 4.00 4.22 4.00 1.69 1.40 
Retail Trade 52 - 59 573 0.47 0.49 4.76 5.00 4.72 5.00 1.33 0.96 
Services 70 - 89 480 0.52 0.50 3.88 4.00 3.95 4.00 1.87 1.26 
Non-classifiable  99 14 0.45 0.45 5.93 6.00 5.93 6.00 0.91 0.83 
Panel B: State distribution  
 
PAI Index Moody's Ratings S&P Ratings Yield Spread (%) 
ST N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AK 2 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.24 3.24 
AL 40 0.48 0.43 4.03 4.00 4.23 4.00 2.10 2.00 
AR 109 0.56 0.50 5.29 6.00 5.28 6.00 0.99 0.72 
AZ 43 0.46 0.64 3.14 3.00 3.19 3.00 3.94 3.03 
CA 405 0.50 0.50 4.18 4.00 4.22 4.00 1.65 1.22 
CO 53 0.56 0.52 3.45 3.00 3.55 3.00 2.50 2.44 
CT 225 0.43 0.40 4.59 5.00 4.62 5.00 1.25 0.93 
DE 80 0.49 0.50 5.18 5.00 5.03 5.00 0.80 0.61 
FL 153 0.51 0.54 3.88 4.00 3.90 4.00 1.97 1.50 
GA 221 0.41 0.18 4.92 5.00 4.88 5.00 1.74 1.29 
HI 19 0.51 0.25 4.05 4.00 3.95 4.00 1.40 1.22 
IA 32 0.44 0.52 4.31 5.00 4.28 5.00 1.84 1.19 
ID 20 0.35 0.00 5.20 5.00 4.85 5.00 1.20 0.90 
IL 454 0.40 0.38 4.78 5.00 4.88 5.00 1.33 0.97 
IN 56 0.51 0.55 4.32 4.00 4.39 4.00 1.87 1.18 
KS 8 0.61 0.69 4.00 4.00 4.38 4.00 1.27 1.29 
KY 19 0.60 0.58 3.79 4.00 3.74 4.00 2.25 2.14 
LA 33 0.46 0.39 2.97 3.00 3.03 3.00 2.98 2.62 
MA 141 0.53 0.70 4.25 4.00 4.26 4.00 1.42 1.01 
MD 66 0.55 0.56 3.97 4.00 4.08 4.00 1.78 1.63 
MI 263 0.39 0.41 4.36 5.00 4.31 4.00 1.53 1.38 
MN 131 0.43 0.44 4.69 5.00 4.73 5.00 1.35 0.98 
MO 191 0.60 0.64 4.72 5.00 4.84 5.00 1.39 1.03 
MS 1 0.35 0.35 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.18 1.18 
MT 7 0.55 0.50 3.57 4.00 4.14 4.00 1.26 0.84 
NC 95 0.47 0.50 4.29 5.00 4.35 5.00 1.84 1.46 
15 
 
ND 13 0.28 0.25 4.31 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.70 0.67 
NE 43 0.45 0.63 3.95 4.00 3.93 4.00 1.77 1.29 
NH 4 0.47 0.44 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.83 3.13 
NJ 163 0.34 0.37 4.61 5.00 4.70 5.00 1.56 1.08 
NM 2 0.50 0.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
NV 59 0.53 0.63 3.12 3.00 3.36 3.00 2.59 2.45 
NY 591 0.45 0.43 4.77 5.00 4.81 5.00 1.09 0.80 
OH 292 0.48 0.24 4.58 5.00 4.57 5.00 1.38 0.97 
OK 77 0.45 0.45 3.40 4.00 3.39 4.00 2.35 2.17 
OR 95 0.45 0.43 4.73 5.00 4.79 5.00 1.24 0.99 
PA 362 0.44 0.49 4.31 5.00 4.30 4.00 1.58 1.18 
RI 41 0.49 0.50 4.76 5.00 4.51 5.00 1.20 1.17 
SC 9 0.55 0.54 4.89 5.00 4.89 5.00 1.35 1.09 
SD 9 0.47 0.38 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.16 1.42 
TN 38 0.46 0.36 3.55 4.00 3.63 4.00 2.27 1.96 
TX 661 0.53 0.47 3.84 4.00 3.95 4.00 2.00 1.50 
UT 13 0.29 0.08 4.08 4.00 4.15 4.00 1.78 1.13 
VA 181 0.53 0.46 3.99 4.00 4.12 4.00 1.82 1.37 
VT 1 0.25 0.25 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 5.73 5.73 
WA 80 0.29 0.22 4.48 4.00 4.61 5.00 1.68 1.26 
WI 48 0.38 0.38 4.42 4.00 4.50 5.00 1.27 1.09 
WV 3 0.47 0.33 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 7.08 6.65 
 
  Table 3 provides summary statistics of my sample. Panel A reports bond issue 
characteristics for the full sample of issuers. There are 5,652 issues from 1,014 issuers. I convert 
Moody’s and S&P rating scales into numerical rating notches from 1 to 21 (low to high) and then 
collapse these scores into 7 categories ranging from 1 to 7, with ratings above 3 categorized as 
investment grade and at or below 3 speculative grade.
13
 For the full sample, 81 percent (83 
percent) of issues are classified as investment grade with an average rating of 4.37 (4.41) from 
Moody’s (S&P). The mean yield spread is 1.59 percent and the mean default spread is 0.90 
percent. The average bond issue is about $296.3 million with a maturity of 12.7 years. The mean 
market capitalization of all issuers is $5.5 billion suggesting that the sample is tilted towards 
large issuers. The average issuer is about 40 years old with a debt ratio of 0.32 and return on 
assets (ROA) of 5 percent. The mean PAI is 0.47, and the average number of bills introduced by 
politicians from the same state is about 159.  
  Panel B presents subsamples of (PAC) contributing, non-contributing, lobbying and non-
lobbying issuers. I examine the impact of corporate political strategies on firms’ cost of debt in 
                                                          
13
 See Appendix A2 for details. 
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Chapter Five. There are univariate differences between firms that actively fund political 
strategies compared to those that do not. For instance, 90 percent (91 percent) of firms that make 
political campaign contributions have their bonds rated investment grade based on Moody’s 
(S&P) compared to 69 percent (72 percent) for firms that do not make political contributions. A 
similar pattern is shown for firms that lobby compared to non-lobbying firms. Yield spreads are 
also lower for contributing relative to non-contributing firms (1.34 percent versus 1.94 percent) 
and firms that lobby compared to non-lobbying firms (1.77 percent versus 2.50 percent). 
Contributing and lobbying firms issue more debt than non-contributing and non-lobbying issuers, 
but the average maturity at issuance is about the same. Contributing firms are close to twice the 
size of non-contributing firms, older and more profitable. The same holds in the comparison of 
lobbying and non-lobbying firms. The mean PAI is roughly similar for both types of contributing 
and lobbying firms. Conditional on making political contributions, the average cumulative PAC 
contribution amount for a rolling three-year period is $0.26 million. For those firms that hire 
lobbyists, the average annual lobbying expense is $1.8million. 
  The summary statistics suggest that issuers that engage in corporate political strategies 
are rated higher by the agencies and have lower yields at issuance. An examination of firm 
characteristics suggests that these firms are also different along many other dimensions. They are 
larger, older, and more profitable, and they also issue more debt. However, my measure of policy 
risk, the political alignment index (PAI) is similar across firms that provide campaign 
contributions or lobby to those that do not. In my multivariate tests, I carefully control for these 
firm-level and issuance characteristics.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics of issue, firm, and state characteristics. Panel A presents summary statistics of 
all issuers. Panel B presents a subsample analysis of political contribution and non-contribution issuers and lobbying 
and non-lobbying issuers. The sample of lobbying and non-lobbying firms starts from 11/01/2000. All the variables 
are defined in Appendix A1.  
 
Panel A Summary statistics of all issuers  
 
Variable Names Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Bond Issue Characteristics 
   MSCORE 4.37 4.00 1.15 
SPSCORE 4.41 4.00 1.14 
MINVDUM 0.81 1.00 0.39 
SPINVDUM 0.83 1.00 0.37 
YIELD SPREAD (%) 1.59 1.17 1.59 
PROCEEDS ($Million) 296.32 199.70 343.59 
RELPROCEEDS 0.08 0.03 0.21 
MATURITY 12.68 10.14 10.93 
SHELF 0.71 1.00 0.46 
DEFAULT SPREAD (%) 0.90 0.84 0.27 
Firm Characteristics 
   MKTCAP ($Billion) 17.81 5.50 34.35 
AGE 39.95 35.00 23.84 
ROA  0.05 0.05 0.06 
MBRATIO 4.14 2.34 31.28 
ICR1 4.10 5.00 1.30 
ICR2 1.72 0.37 2.07 
ICR3 1.10 0.00 2.73 
ICR4  1.18 0.00 7.41 
DEBT RATIO 0.32 0.31 0.16 
BHRET 0.05 0.00 0.44 
BETA 0.89 0.86 0.44 
IDIO_RISK (x100) 1.87 1.63 0.95 
TANGIBILITY 0.43 0.41 0.24 
ALTMAN’S Z-SCORE (/100) 0.03 0.02 0.02 
State Characteristics 
   CONVICTION RATE 3.30 3.03 1.97 
RBENEFIT_SALES 0.29 0.25 0.19 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 0.05 0.05 0.01 
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE 0.06 0.06 0.02 
PERSONAL INCOME 0.05 0.04 0.03 
PAI 0.47 0.46 0.22 
ΔPAI -0.00 0.00 0.26 
BILLNUM 159.38 122.00 124.97 
LNBILLNUM 4.84 4.84 0.77 
ΔLNBILLNUM 0.01 0.10 0.69 
LN (
       
       
) 2.87 2.81 0.55 
# of Issues  5652 
  # of Issuers 1014 
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Panel B Summary statistics of contribution issuers and lobbying issuers 
 
Contribution 
Issuers 
Non-Contribution 
Issuers Lobbying Issuers 
Non-Lobbying 
Issuers 
Variable Names Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Bond Issue Characteristics 
        MSCORE 4.65 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.42 4.00 3.71 4.00 
SPSCORE 4.68 5.00 4.06 4.00 4.46 4.00 3.78 4.00 
MINVDUM 0.90 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.61 1.00 
SPINVDUM 0.91 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.63 1.00 
YIELD SPREAD (%) 1.34 1.07 1.94 1.35 1.77 1.44 2.50 2.11 
PROCEEDS ($Million) 323.38 200.00 260.45 198.15 510.08 398.60 363.62 253.60 
RELPROCEEDS 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.06 
MATURITY 13.41 10.14 11.71 10.14 11.81 10.14 10.54 10.13 
SHELF 0.77 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.56 1.00 
DEFAULT SPREAD (%) 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.81 1.03 0.92 1.00 0.91 
Firm Characteristics 
        MKTCAP ($Billion) 21.44 8.36 13.00 2.83 33.01 14.46 14.86 3.18 
AGE 43.53 40.00 35.21 32.00 45.50 41.00 34.58 30.00 
ROA  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
MB 3.92 2.40 4.43 2.28 4.48 2.74 3.58 2.08 
ICR1 4.20 5.00 3.97 5.00 4.15 5.00 4.04 5.00 
ICR2 1.75 0.45 1.69 0.21 2.18 1.55 1.78 0.19 
ICR3 1.17 0.00 1.02 0.00 1.85 0.00 1.35 0.00 
ICR4  1.14 0.00 1.23 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.74 0.00 
DEBT RATIO 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.33 
BHRET 0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.11 
BETA 0.86 0.84 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.94 0.92 
IDIO_RISK (x100) 1.69 1.52 2.12 1.82 1.79 1.59 2.18 1.88 
TANGIBILITY 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.31 
ALTMAN’S Z-SCORE (/100) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
State Characteristics 
        CONVICTION RATE 3.26 2.99 3.36 3.12 3.14 2.93 3.02 2.69 
RBENEFIT_SALES 0.27 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.24 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
PERSOL INCOME 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 
PAI 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.53 
ΔPAI 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
BILLNUM 154.04 116.00 166.46 128.00 166.88 129.00 182.08 140.00 
ΔLNBILLNUM 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.28 
LN (
         
         
) 
2.86 2.80 2.89 2.83 3.14 2.93 3.02 2.69 
Corporate Political Strategies 
CONTRDUM 
    
0.79 1.00 0.28 0.00 
CONTRAMT  ($M) 0.26 0.13 
      LOBDUM  0.80 1.00 0.30 0.00 
    LOBEXP ($M)   
    
1.82 0.71 
  # of Issues 3222 
 
2430 
 
1360 
 
959 
 # of Issuers 436 
 
672 
 
320 
 
359 
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Chapter Four: Policy Risk and the Cost of Debt 
Relation between Policy Risk, Credit Ratings, and Yield Spreads 
  In Table 4, I examine the relation between policy risk, credit ratings and yield spreads. I 
first focus on the full sample and subsequently on subsamples formed after double-sorting on 
PAI and variables that can help to better illuminate the nature of the relationship between PAI 
and the cost of debt. In panel A, I report means and medians of Moody’s credit ratings and yield 
spreads for subsamples of firms formed based on a tercile sort on my policy risk measure (PAI). 
Firms associated with the lowest levels of PAI have better credit scores than firms associated 
with higher PAI rankings. Even though this result is not linear, the difference-in-means (and 
difference-in-medians) tests between the highest and lowest groups are statistically significant. 
Firms with the lowest PAI scores have yields that are 19 basis points lower and credit ratings that 
are higher by a magnitude of 0.25 than firms with the highest PAI scores.   
  The univariate results imply that the political landscape of a firm’s geographical location 
may induce uncertainty about the firm’s future cash flows that manifests itself as an additional 
component to the firm’s cost of debt. This uncertainty can originate from several sources. First, it 
could be linked to the size of the firm. Smaller firms are less likely to maintain active corporate 
political strategies and thus they will be less equipped to cope with policy risk (Cooper, Gulen, 
and Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Second, uncertainty about the impact of local politics on firms’ future 
cash flows could be correlated with the firm’s degree of dependence on government spending. 
Julio and Yook (2012) show that in the face of political uncertainty firms often choose to reduce 
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investment expenditures until the uncertainty is resolved. Thus, if a firm’s political geography 
induces uncertainty  
Table 4: Bond Ratings and Yield Spreads by PAI Index  
 
This table presents comparisons of Moody’s bond ratings and yield spreads for PAI index tercile groups. Double 
sorts based on tercile groups of the PAI index and firm size, dependence on government spending 
(RBENEFIT_SALES), local conviction rates (CONVICTION RATE), and legislative intensity (BILLNUM) are 
presented in panels A, B, and C, respectively. Column (1) presents results for Moody’s bond ratings, and Column 
(2) presents results for yield spreads. Tests for differences in means (or medians) are conducted to examine whether 
means (or medians) of corporate bond ratings or yield spreads are significantly different between group (3) and 
group (1). All other variables are defined in Appendix A1. Wilcoxon tests are performed to test differences of 
medians. Corresponding p-values from means tests (or medians tests in parentheses) are reported in parentheses.*, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Moody’s Ratings 
(1) 
 
Yield Spread (%) 
(2) 
Panel A Summary statistics for PAI index tercile groups 
PAI Mean 
 
Median Mean 
 
Median 
1  4.43 
 
5.00 1.59 
 
1.16 
2 4.47 
 
5.00 1.41 
 
1.05 
3  4.18 
 
4.00 1.78 
 
1.33 
(3) - (1) 
-0.25***  
(0.000) 
 
-1.00*** 
(0.000) 
0.19*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.17*** 
(0.000) 
Panel B: Firm size 
PAI  Small Large Large – Small ( P-value) Small Large Large – Small (p-value) 
1  3.71 5.11 1.40*** (0.000) 2.35 1.04 -1.31*** (0.000) 
2 3.65 5.22 1.57*** (0.000) 2.33 0.64 -1.69*** (0.000) 
3  3.44 5.00 1.56*** (0.000) 2.73 0.98 -1.75*** (0.000) 
(3) - (1)                            
-0.27*** 
(0.000) 
-0.11* 
(0.053)  
0.38*** 
(0.000) 
-0.06 
(0.461)  
Panel C: Dependence on government spending 
   PAI Less More More – Less ( P-value) Less More More – Less ( P-value) 
1  4.64 4.17 -0.47*** (0.000) 1.39 1.84 0.45*** (0.000) 
2 4.79 4.16 -0.63*** (0.000) 1.23 1.50 0.27*** (0.002) 
3  4.53 4.02 -0.51*** (0.000) 1.64 1.89 0.25*** (0.006) 
(3) - (1)                            
-0.11  
(0.118) 
-0.15** 
(0.014)  
0.25*** 
(0.005) 
0.05 
(0.557)  
Panel D: State conviction rate 
    PAI Low High High- Low ( P-value) Low High High- Low  ( P-value) 
1  4.10 4.47 0.37*** (0.000) 1.79 1.56 -0.23* (0.052) 
2 4.54 4.46 -0.08 (0.291) 1.41 1.39 -0.02 (0.822) 
3  4.58 4.08 -0.50*** (0.000) 1.97 1.81 -0.16(0.225) 
(3) - (1)                            
0.48*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.39*** 
(0.000)  
0.18 
(0.328) 
0.25** 
(0.000)  
Panel E: Legislative intensity 
    PAI Low High High- Low ( P-value) Low High High- Low  ( P-value) 
1  4.41 4.45 0.04 (0.638) 1.55 1.60 0.05 (0.712) 
2 4.53 4.45 -0.08 (0.311) 1.37 1.38 0.01 (0.908) 
3  4.17 4.12 -0.05 (0.675) 1.52 1.87 0.35*** (0.010) 
(3) - (1)                            
-0.24**  
(0.027) 
-0.33*** 
(0.000)  
-0.03 
(0.812) 
0.27*** 
(0.000)  
21 
 
that causes underinvestment it can generate the perception of higher risk among investors. This 
effect could be even stronger when firms become too dependent on government spending.
14
 
Third, PAI’s impact on the cost of debt should be more pronounced when there is more 
corruption among local politicians. If firms’ future cash flows are contingent on political 
initiatives that rely on the support of politicians that operate in a corrupt environment, they will 
be perceived as more risky by outside investors who assess the possibility of legal violations that 
can originate from social links between firms and politicians (i.e. risk of engaging in corrupt 
dealings).
15
 Finally, policy risk should be particularly strong when there is greater legislative 
activity that relates to the firm because legislative activity can create uncertainty regarding the 
redistribution of future growth opportunities among firms within an industry and/or state. This 
effect intensifies in high PAI states, because politicians from these areas are typically better 
positioned to influence the political agenda and lead legislative initiatives. These arguments are 
supported by the evidence in Kim et al. (2012) who show that the effect of PAI on stock returns 
is stronger when there is a high level of legislative activity by local politicians and conclude that 
uncertainty injected in the market by legislative activity is a major source of policy risk.  
  I examine the importance of the aforementioned features of policy risk in Panels B 
through E in Table 4. Specifically, I report means of credit ratings and yield spreads across 
groups of firms formed after sorting on both PAI and on size, dependence on government 
spending, corruption (measured by the conviction rate of public officials), and legislative 
                                                          
14
 This notion is supported by the findings of Cohen, Coval and Malloy (2011) who use changes in 
congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal government 
spending. They find that such spending shocks appear to significantly reduce corporate sector investment activity. 
Since high PAI areas are more likely candidates for representation in committee chairmanships, such an effect could 
be more pronounced among firms located in high PAI areas.   
15
 This view is consistent with the findings of Chen, Ding and Kim (2010) who show that political 
connections aggravate information asymmetries between investors and managers, particularly in corrupt 
environments. 
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intensity, respectively.
16
 The results show that the cost of debt (as reflected in lower credit 
ratings and higher yield spreads) is highest among firms located in high PAI areas when they are 
small, when they rely more on government spending, and when there is a high level of legislative 
intensity by local politicians. The interplay of PAI and the conviction rate does not produce a 
clearly stronger pattern of PAI impact across all three measures of the cost of debt. Overall, the 
results are consistent with the notion that, through its various dimensions, policy uncertainty is 
indeed associated with a greater cost of debt.  
  My univariate sorts presented in Table 4 suggest a relation between policy risk, credit 
ratings, and yield spreads. I more formally test this relation using multivariate methods 
controlling for firm, market, issuance, and state characteristics in the next section.  
Model Description  
  Similar to Baghai, Servaes and Tamayo (2011) and Huang, Ritter and Zhang (2012) I use 
ordered logistic regressions to test the relation between policy risk and corporate bond ratings 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test the relation between policy risk and yield 
spreads. Following Petersen (2009), I cluster standard errors at the firm-level and also control for 
industry, state, and year fixed effects.
17
 
  Rating agencies use both public and non-public information to evaluate firms’ credit risk 
and assign credit ratings.
18
 The list of firm-specific characteristics that are typically considered in 
                                                          
16
 The conviction rate has been used as a proxy of political corruption by Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 
(2009), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2004), Glaeser and Saks (2006) among others. It 
is measured by the number of per capita corruption convictions of local, state, and federal officials (available from 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Public Integrity Section) and normalized by the state population. It is 
important to recognize that the conviction rate per se is not a direct measure of public officials’ corruption. For 
example, a low conviction rate could indicate low levels of corruption among public officials or alternatively less 
strict enforcement of laws or muted prosecutorial zeal in that state (Boylan and Long, 2003). 
17
 My results remain consistent if I cluster by state and control for state, year, and industry fixed effects.  
18
 Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) find that the information content of credit ratings has increased after the 
passage of regulation FD on October 23, 2000. The regulation does not have restrictions on preventing credit rating 
agencies from receiving non-public information from companies.   
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this process includes the level of the firm’s profits and earnings prospects, ability to pay interest 
and  principal, the value of intangible assets, the quality of management, indicators for financial 
distress, among others (Ang and Patel, 1975; Anderson et al., 2003; Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay, 
1998; Fons, Cantor, and Mahoney, 2002, Cremers et al., 2007; Qi et al., 2010; Baghai et al., 
2011; Huang et al., 2012; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller, 2011). After including other important 
control variables from the extant literature, my ordered logistic model takes the following form: 
MSCOREit = f(PAI (or ΔPAI), DEFAULT SPREAD, RELPROCEEDS, LNMATURITY, 
SHELF, LNMKTCAP, LNAGE, ROA, LNMB, ICR1, ICR2, ICR3, ICR4, DEBT 
RATIO, BHRET, BETA, IDIO_RISK, TANGIBILITY, ALTMAN’S Z-SCORE, 
UTILITY, CONVICTION RATE, RBENEFIT_SALES, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE, PERSONAL INCOME, INVERSE MILLS RATIO Bond 
Issue)                                                                                    (2) 
 
where the dependent variable MSCORE is the Moody’s rescaled rating score with higher ratings 
reflecting higher credit quality. PAI is the political alignment index (PAI) constructed by Kim et 
al. (2012). This is the key variable in my tests that I use as a proxy for policy risk. I expect PAI 
to be negatively related to credit ratings if rating agencies view local policy uncertainty as a 
source of firms’ credit risk. Alternatively, I also use the change in the PAI index, ΔPAI. I expect 
a similar relation between ΔPAI and corporate bond ratings.  
  The major focus of this paper is to estimate the relation between policy risk and the yield 
spread, which is a direct measure of a firm’s borrowing cost. I use an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model to test the determinants of the yield spread as follows:  
YIELD SPREAD (%) = f(PAI (or ΔPAI), DEFAULT SPREAD, RELPROCEEDS, 
LNMATURITY, SHELF, LNMKTCAP, LNAGE, ROA, LNMB, ICR1, ICR2, ICR3, 
ICR4, DEBT RATIO, BHRET, BETA, IDIO_RISK, TANGIBILITY, ALTMAN’S Z-
SCORE, UTILITY, CONVICTION RATE, RBENEFIT_SALES, UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE, STATE GDP GROWTH RATE, PERSONAL INCOME, MSCORE_RES, 
SPSCORE_RES, INVERSE MILLS RATIO Bond Issue)          (6) 
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where YIELD SPREAD (%) is computed as the difference between the yield to maturity of the 
new bond issue and the rate of a treasury bond with similar maturity. If policy risk is related to 
the cost of debt, I expect that PAI is positively related to the yield spread (YIELD SPREAD (%)). 
This model is identical to the model predicting credit ratings with one exception. MSCORE_RES 
is the residual from the OLS regression of Moody’s ratings estimated using the variables in 
Model (3) with the addition of SPSCORE. Similarly, SPSCORE_RES is the residual from OLS 
regression of S&P ratings estimated using the variables in Model (3) with the addition of 
MSCORE. Since credit ratings are indicators of firms’ creditworthiness and have been found to 
provide valuable information to investors about firms’ credit risk I include these variables in my 
model.
19
 I expect a negative relation between the residuals of credit ratings and the yield spread.  
  The remaining variables used in Table 5 are issuance and firm controls. DEFAULT 
SPREAD (%) is the default spread computed as the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA 
corporate bond yields. There is no obvious relation between credit ratings and the default spread, 
but clearly the default spread and yield spread should be positively related. RELPROCEEDS is 
the gross proceeds from the bond issue scaled by total assets. I expect lower credit ratings and 
higher yield spreads for firms with higher relative proceeds because as debt increases relative to 
total assets firms become riskier. LNMATURITY is the natural logarithm of the issue maturity 
and SHELF is a dummy which is set equal to one if an issue is shelf registered. I make no 
conjectures regarding the coefficients’ signs of these issue characteristics. 
  I control for the following firm characteristics. LNMKTCAP is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the issuing firm’s age. ROA is return on 
total assets. I expect that larger, older, and more profitable firms are more likely to receive higher 
                                                          
19
 See Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), Kliger and Sarig (2000), Kisgen (2006, 2009), Kisgen and 
Strahan (2010), and Purda (2011) for studies recognizing the importance of credit ratings. 
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credit ratings and have lower yield spreads. LNMB is the natural logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio and since it is used as a proxy for future growth opportunities, I expect it to be positively 
related to credit ratings and thus negatively related to yield spreads. Blume et al. (1998) and 
Huang et al. (2012) suggest that the interest coverage ratio has a non-linear impact on credit risk, 
so I follow Huang et al. (2012) and create four interest coverage ratio variables: ICR1, ICR2, 
ICR3, and ICR4. DEBT RATIO is the ratio of total debt over total assets and I expect that more 
leverage transcends into lower bond ratings. BHRET is the stock’s one-year buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted return before the issue date. If rating agencies use past performance in their 
determination of credit ratings, then I anticipate better performing firms will receive higher credit 
ratings. As suggested by Dichev and Piotroski (1999) and Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and 
Philipov (2007), credit risk is related to equity returns. I expect lower yield spreads for firms 
with higher past stock returns. BETA is the beta estimated from the market model using daily 
returns. IDIO_RISK is the mean standard error of residual returns. Both BETA and IDIO_RISK 
are measured one year before the issue date and are expected to be negatively related to bond 
ratings and positively related to yield spreads because they capture systematic and firm-specific 
risk, respectively. UTILITY is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm belongs to the utility 
industry and zero otherwise. Since utilities are regulated and thus provide investors a safeguard 
against default, I expect that they receive better credit ratings and have lower yield spreads.  
  Some state characteristics might affect firms’ cost of debt as discussed earlier. In my 
multivariate analysis, I also control for the extent of corruption (CONVICTION RATE), firms’ 
dependence on state spending (RBENEFIT_SALES), the state GDP growth rate (STATE GDP 
GROWTH RATE), and personal income (PERSONAL INCOME).  
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Table 5: Policy Risk, Corporate Bond Ratings, and Yield Spreads 
 
This table presents estimates from ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The 
dependent variables are Moody’s rescaled credit ratings (MSCORE) for columns (1) and (2) and the yield spread in 
percentage, YIELD SPREAD (%), calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the 
yield of a treasury security with similar maturity for columns (3) to (6). PAI is the political alignment index at time t, 
and ΔPAI is the change of the political alignment index from time t-1 to time t. SPSCORE_RES and 
MSCORE_RES are the residuals from OLS regressions with similar variables in the first two columns plus either 
S&P or Moody’s rescaled rating scores. Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model 
that predicts the probability for a firm to issue a straight corporate bond in Appendix A3. I follow Butler and Wan 
(2010) and estimate the model as such: Bond Issue Choice (0 or 1) = f(ΔPAI, LNAMIHUD, GROWTH, NET 
PROFIT MARGIN, LNMKTCAP, LNAGE, DIVIDEND_PAYER, LNMB, DEBT RATIO, ALTMAN’S Z-
SCORE, TANGIBILITY, BHRET, RETVOL, State, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A1. Firm control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below 
the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but 
not reported. z -values are in square brackets where clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping 
procedure with 200 replications. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Moody’s Ratings Yield Spread (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAI -0.532** 
 
0.174** 1.226*** 
  
 
(-2.22) 
 
(2.10) (2.72) 
  
 
[-2.29] 
 
[2.17] [2.79] 
  ΔPAI 
 
-0.652***  
 
0.167** 0.660 
  
(-3.23) 
  
(2.22) (1.64) 
  
[-3.11] 
  
[2.19] [1.57] 
PAI*LNMKTCAP 
   
-0.125** 
  
    
(-2.40) 
  
    
[-2.48] 
  ΔPAI*LNMKTCAP 
     
-0.057 
      
(-1.29) 
      
[-1.25] 
DEFAULT SPREAD (%) 0.127 0.091 1.058*** 1.065*** 1.069*** 1.065*** 
  (0.47) (0.34) (5.92) (5.99) (5.99) (5.97) 
Bond Issue Characteristics 
      RELPROCEEDS -5.413*** -5.423*** 0.463*** 0.484*** 0.456*** 0.462*** 
 
(-5.35) (-5.31) (3.94) (4.19) (3.89) (3.95) 
LNMATURITY 0.096* 0.093* 0.086** 0.086** 0.086** 0.086** 
 
(1.74) (1.68) (2.37) (2.39) (2.38) (2.39) 
SHELF 0.579*** 0.582*** -0.163*** -0.160*** -0.163*** -0.162*** 
  (4.92) (4.92) (-2.66) (-2.62) (-2.66) (-2.65) 
Firm Characteristics 
      LNMKTCAP 1.171*** 1.193*** -0.315*** -0.255*** -0.319*** -0.318*** 
 
(6.64) (6.81) (-6.19) (-4.52) (-6.29) (-6.26) 
LNAGE 0.135 0.143 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(1.40) (1.48) (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
ROA 1.882 1.725 -0.087 -0.090 -0.046 -0.079 
 
(0.99) (0.90) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.13) 
LNMB -0.154 -0.175 -0.119** -0.115* -0.115* -0.114* 
 
(-0.69) (-0.79) (-2.00) (-1.95) (-1.94) (-1.92) 
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Firm Characteristics(cont’d) 
ICR1 0.439*** 0.436*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.155*** 
 
(6.10) (6.07) (-7.07) (-7.11) (-7.03) (-7.07) 
ICR2 0.053 0.061 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 
 
(1.10) (1.25) (-0.73) (-0.74) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
ICR3 0.067** 0.065** 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 
(2.52) (2.45) (0.92) (0.95) (0.96) (0.91) 
ICR4 0.012 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(1.37) (1.42) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.36) (-0.33) 
DEBT RATIO -1.681* -1.606* 0.771*** 0.771*** 0.758*** 0.758*** 
 
(-1.72) (-1.65) (2.96) (2.98) (2.91) (2.91) 
BHRET -0.596*** -0.594*** -0.136** -0.142*** -0.135** -0.134** 
 
(-4.27) (-4.24) (-2.57) (-2.71) (-2.56) (-2.54) 
BETA -0.422** -0.435** 0.153** 0.150** 0.157** 0.158*** 
 
(-2.35) (-2.46) (2.50) (2.46) (2.57) (2.59) 
IDIO_RISK (x100) -1.070*** -1.080*** 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.559*** 
 
(-8.16) (-8.26) (14.28) (14.27) (14.41) (14.42) 
TANGIBILITY 0.997* 1.021* -0.087 -0.099 -0.089 -0.086 
 
(1.73) (1.77) (-0.56) (-0.64) (-0.58) (-0.56) 
ALTMAN'S Z-SCORE (/100) 20.69*** 20.86*** -1.790 -1.827 -1.792 -1.751 
 
(3.40) (3.45) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.95) 
UTILITY 1.095 1.091 -0.018 -0.011 -0.012 -0.007 
  (1.30) (1.30) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.04) 
State Characteristics 
      CONVICTION RATE -0.021 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(-0.72) (-0.52) (-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.91) 
RBENEFIT_SALES -0.232 -0.202 0.035 0.013 0.040 0.035 
 
(-0.26) (-0.22) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 5.205 3.346 -2.153 -2.246 -1.907 -1.812 
 
(0.56) (0.36) (-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.51) (-0.48) 
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE 2.346 1.923 0.0100 0.206 0.173 0.269 
 
(0.90) (0.74) (0.01) (0.18) (0.15) (0.23) 
PERSONAL INCOME 23.16 15.34 10.57 10.43 11.47 11.33 
  (0.94) (0.62) (1.28) (1.27) (1.40) (1.38) 
Other Controls 
      INVERSE MILLS RATIO Bond Issue -2.402 -2.762 0.286 0.290 0.349 0.327 
 (-1.15) (-1.32) (0.42) (0.44) (0.52) (0.49) 
SPSCORE_RES 
  
-0.838*** -0.837*** -0.836*** -0.833*** 
   
(-12.65) (-12.77) (-12.66) (-12.77) 
MSCORE_RES 
  
-0.844*** -0.844*** -0.842*** -0.839*** 
  
  
(-13.29) (-13.43) (-13.28) (-13.39) 
Intercept 
  
0.434 0.080 0.421 0.397 
   
(0.78) (0.14) (0.77) (0.72) 
Firm Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 5652 5652 5652 5652 5652 5652 
R2 0.4530 0.4538 0.6227 0.6234 0.6227 0.6227 
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  Since firms might self-select into issuing bonds or the timing of bond issues, I include the 
inverse Mills ratio (INVERSE MILLS RATIO Bond Issue) from a probit model that predicts the 
probability that a firm will issue straight corporate bonds using all Compustat firms.
20
 Similar to 
Butler and Wan (2010), my predictors include Amihud’s illiquidity, growth prospects, net profit 
margin, size, age, market-to-book ratio, dividend payer indicator, debt ratio, Altman’s Z-score, 
tangibility, return, and volatility. I also control for election year, industry, and state fixed effects. 
Because multicollinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and regressors is likely to arise in the 
second stage, the covariance matrix generated in the second stage using OLS estimations might 
be inconsistent and thus standard errors are inflated. To address such concerns, I also report 
corrected standard errors by resampling through a bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications 
following Pagan (1984). 
Multivariate Results 
  The first two models in Table 5 present the results from an ordered logistic regression of 
policy risk corporate bond ratings with other controls. As expected, my main variable of interest, 
PAI is negatively related to Moody’s ratings on new bond issues, implying that ratings agencies 
consider local political uncertainty when they assess a firm’s credit risk. The coefficient of my 
alternative measure of policy risk, ΔPAI is similarly negative and significant.21 Holding other 
factors constant, for one standard deviation decrease in PAI(ΔPAI),  the odds of having a higher 
                                                          
20
 In Appendix A3, I show that the probability to issue straight corporate bond is lower for firms exposed to 
higher policy risk as proxied by the change in PAI index. Julio and Yook (2012) suggest that firms reduce their 
investment when there is higher political uncertainty during election years, and I also show that firms alter their debt 
financing practices even if they are exposed to higher political uncertainty. In Appendix A6, I find that there is not 
much difference in the average maturity of bond issues for states that are exposed to higher and lower political 
uncertainty.  
21
 In my bootstrapping procedure to estimate Moody’s ratings, convergence could not be achieved. Rather 
than force convergence, I use OLS regression estimation to report bootstrapped standard errors. The same applies to 
the result in Table 13.  
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Moody’s rating score compared to a lower one increase by the factor of 0.890 (or 0.844).22 The 
signs of other control variables are generally consistent with my expectations and the prior 
literature. The coefficient on the default spread is negative, albeit insignificant. Shelf registered 
offerings and firms that are larger, older, having higher interest coverage ratio, and higher 
Altman’s Z-score receive higher credit ratings. Issuers with more proceeds, higher total leverage, 
higher volatility, higher firm specific risk, and better past one-year stock performance have lower 
credit ratings.  
  The right-hand side of Table 5 presents results from OLS regressions of yield spread on 
policy risk and other controls. In line with the results from the credit ratings regressions, the 
coefficient of PAI is positive and significant, suggesting that firms located in states with higher 
policy risk have a higher cost of debt than firms located in states with lower policy risk. I find 
similar results using the change of the PAI index. The corrected standard errors for both PAI and 
the change of the PAI index are also significant using the bootstrapping procedure with 200 
replications. This result is consistent with the notion that the heightened uncertainty about the 
impact of future policies on firms’ future cash flows is priced in the market for new corporate 
bond issues. Such policy risk, which emanates from greater proximity to political power, is 
larger among firms headquartered in high PAI states.  
  Based on the evidence from Kim et al. (2012) as well as from my results from Table 4, 
my expectation is that the policy risk effect on the cost of debt is going to be more pronounced 
among smaller firms. In order to verify this, I also explore models that include an interaction 
term between PAI and size. The coefficient of the interaction term PAI*LNMKTCAP is negative 
and significant, indicating that the PAI effect on the yield spread is stronger among smaller 
                                                          
22
 The way I compute factor changes is as such: 0.890 = exp (-0.532 x 0.22)) and 0.844 = exp (-0.652 x 
0.26).  
30 
 
firms. For small firms the PAI effect is not only significant in statistical terms but also in 
economic terms. Specifically, for firms in the bottom quartile of market capitalization, a one 
standard deviation increase in PAI will result in an increase in the yield spread of 16 basis points. 
Table 6: Yield Spreads for Short and Long Maturity Bonds 
 
This table presents estimates of policy risk on yield spreads from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for bond 
issues with short and long maturities. Short maturity refers to bonds with maturities less than five years and Long 
maturity refers to bonds with maturities longer than five years. The dependent variable, YIELD SPREAD (%), is the 
yield spread in percentage calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a 
treasury security with similar maturity. PAI is the political alignment index, and ΔPAI is the change of the political 
alignment index from time t-1 to time t. All other variables are defined in Appendix A1. Firm control variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but not reported. z -values are in square 
brackets where clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Yield Spread (%) 
Dependent Variable 
Short maturity 
(1) 
Long maturity 
(2) 
PAI 0.153  0.175** 
 
 
(0.45)  (2.21) 
  [0.53]  [2.17]  
ΔPAI 
 
0.328  0.143** 
  
(0.94)  (2.11) 
  [0.73]  [2.27] 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics  Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics  Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y 
Firm Cluster Y Y Y Y 
Year Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
N 544 544 5108 5108 
R2 0.5621 0.5621 0.7147 0.7146 
 
  Similar to the models explaining credit ratings, the signs of the coefficients on the other 
control variables coefficients are generally as expected. The coefficients of the residuals of the 
credit ratings are negative and significant as predicted, in line with the view that issues receiving 
better credit ratings display significantly lower costs of debt.  
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  The impact of policy risk on yield spreads might be different for bonds with different 
maturities.  Long-term bonds are exposed to more interest rate risk, and therefore their price 
fluctuations should be more sensitive to interest rate changes compared with those of short-term 
bonds. In Table 6, I divide my sample of bond issues into bonds with short and long maturities, 
where short maturity is defined as bonds with maturities of five years or less and long maturity is 
five years or more. Consistent with my conjecture that long maturity bonds are more sensitive to 
policy risk, I find that the coefficient of PAI or ΔPAI is not significant for the bonds with short 
maturities, but is positive and significant for bonds with long maturities.   
Other Proxies for Policy Risk 
  Throughout my analysis I have used PAI developed by Kim et al. (2012) as a measure of 
political uncertainty. In this section I introduce two other proxies for policy risk related to 
legislative uncertainties. The first measure I employ is ΔLNBILLNUM, which is the time-series 
change of the natural logarithm of the number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from 
a particular state that are serving in a given year in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate 
chambers of the U.S. Congress. In Table 1, state politicians aligned with the President’s party 
tend to introduce more bills, which is indicative of their influence on the legislative process. 
Generally, bills passing both chambers of Congress constitute rare events preceded by great 
uncertainty regarding their final form, which is typically determined during a lengthy legislative 
process where politicians of influence often manage to amend bills before they become law. As a 
consequence, firms in states of influential politicians whose legislative activities usually targets 
home constituents can be exposed to more policy uncertainty. Thus, the second measure is the 
ratio of the number of bills introduced over the number of bills passed, LN (
         
         
), which 
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captures the part of the uncertainty in the legislative process that is associated with the likelihood 
that a bill will become law.  
Table 7: Alternative Policy Risk Proxies 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions estimates of yield spread using alternative proxies for 
policy risk. The dependent variable, YIELD SPREAD (%), is the yield spread in percentage calculated as the 
difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a treasury security with similar maturity. 
LNBILLNUM is the natural logarithm of the number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians in a state for a 
given year, and ΔLNBILLNUM is the change of LNBILLNUM from year t-1 to year t. LN (
         
         
) is the 
natural log of the ratio between the number of bills introduced (BILLNUM) by politicians from a particular state and 
the number of bills that finally become law (PLAWNUM). All other variables are defined in Appendix A1. Firm 
control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but not reported. z-
values are in square brackets where clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping procedure with 200 
replications. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Yield Spread (%) 
 
(3) (3) (3) (4) 
Δ LNBILLNUM 0.147* 0.211*** 
 
 
 
(1.79) (3.98) 
 
 
 [1.73] [2.40]   
LN (
         
         
) 
  
0.067** 0.066** 
   
(2.07)     (2.00) 
   [2.03] [2.01] 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics  Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics  Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y 
Firm Cluster Y 
 
Y 
 Firm Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
Year Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y N Y N 
N 5652 5652 5652 5652 
R2 0.6230 0.7417 0.6230 0.7412 
  Table 7 presents these results. The evidence is consistent with the results found using the 
PAI index.
23
 Both measures are positive and significant in predicting yield spreads, providing 
further support for my notion that borrowing costs are higher for firms headquartered in states 
that are exposed to more political uncertainty. 
                                                          
23
 In unreported tests, I find that when both the PAI index and ΔLNBILLNUM are included in my models, 
their coefficients remain positive and significant.  
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Bond Issues around Presidential Elections 
  Julio and Yook (2012) and others have shown that there is substantial political 
uncertainty around presidential elections. Presidential elections represent political shocks as the 
outcomes can heavily weigh on future policies.  Thus, such events could have a significant 
impact on bond yields.  
Table 8: Bond Issues around Presidential Elections 
 
The table presents regression analysis of yield spreads around presidential elections for states with very close 
election outcomes. Election outcomes by states are collected from http://uselectionatlas.org. I define close election 
outcomes as the lowest tercile group relative to the percentage margin of victory. PRE-ELECTION is within two 
years before presidential election date, and POST-ELECTION is within two years after the presidential election 
date. I sort my sample into low and high PAI states based on terciles of the PAI index at time t-1. Columns (1) and 
(2) present subsamples of bond issuers from low PAI states at time t-1, and Columns (3) and (4) present subsamples 
of bond issuers from high PAI states at time t-1.I also rank the change in PAI index (ΔPAI) into three groups. 
Positive ΔPAI (Negative) is a dummy which is one for the top (bottom) tercile of ΔPAI. For distribution statistics of 
PAI and ΔPAI, please refer to Appendix A5. The dependent variable, YIELD SPREAD (%), is the yield spread in 
percentage calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a treasury security 
with similar maturity. All other variables are defined in Appendix A1. Firm control variables are winsorized at the 
top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but not reported. z-values are in square brackets where 
clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Yield Spread (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
PRE-ELECTION POST-ELECTION PRE-ELECTION POST-ELECTION 
  Low PAIt-1 High PAIt-1 
Positive ΔPAI -1.172* 1.367** 
  
 
(-1.70) (2.04) 
  
 [-0.18] [1.86]   
Negative ΔPAI 
  
2.921*** -12.13 
 
  
(2.90) (-1.64) 
   [1.73] [-0.57] 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y 
Firm Cluster Y Y Y Y 
Year Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y N Y Y 
N 200 383 305 217 
R2 0.7150 0.8379 0.8520 0.8849 
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  In Table 8, I study corporate bond issues that occurred within a two-year period before 
and after tight (“close-call”) presidential elections. This is when political uncertainty is 
presumably most severe. Election outcomes are collected from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections.
24
 I define tight election outcomes as those falling in the lowest tercile 
after sorting on the percentage margin of electoral victory.
25
 Next, I rank issuers into three 
groups based on the PAI index of the issuer’s state in the pre-election period. In columns (1) and 
(2), I include only issuers from states with the lowest PAI and rank them into three groups again 
based on the change in PAI following the election. Issuers in states with little change in PAI are 
the control group, and issuers in the states with a large positive change in PAI are the treatment 
group. In columns (3) and (4), I follow a similar approach but include only issuers from states 
with the highest PAI and define issuers in the states with little or no change in PAI as my control 
group and issuers with a large negative change in PAI as my treatment group.
26
 
  In column 1, before the election, the treatment group with a large positive change in PAI 
(Positive ΔPAI) does not incur higher borrowing costs. Recall these firms are located in states 
with low policy risk before the election. After the election (column 2) however, firms in states 
that become significantly more aligned with the presidential party indeed experience 
significantly higher borrowing costs.  
  In column 3, I examine the opposite case—alignment along opposition party lines. Before 
the election, firms in states that were highly aligned with the president’s party experience 
significantly higher borrowing costs. Post-election, firms in states that move the farthest along 
                                                          
24
 See http://uselectionatlas.org/.  
25
 The mean of the percentage margin of electoral victory from low to high based on tercile distribution is 
about 4%, 13%, and 29% separately in my unreported table. The percentage margin of electoral victory is computed 
as the percentage of votes to the President minus the percentage of votes to the opponent.  
26
 Please refer to Appendix A5 for summary statistics for the tercile distribution of the PAI index and the 
change of the PAI index.  
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the PAI spectrum no longer experience a higher cost of debt. This test further reinforces the view 
that domestic policy risk is an important determinant of firms’ borrowing costs. 
Monthly Bond Returns  
  If policy risk is a determinant of corporate borrowing costs, it should be related to bond 
returns. I test this at the state level using time-series corporate bond data in a pooled OLS model 
that accounts for other known determinants of bond returns like the three Fama-French factors, 
Amihud’s bond illiquidity factor, and several macroeconomic variables.27 The advantages of this 
test are twofold. First, using time-series data allows me to examine whether policy risk has an 
impact on the prices of outstanding bonds. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is little 
concern regarding self-selection bias in tests utilizing time-series data.  
 In addition to PAI, I also use the change in the PAI index, ΔPAI, and the time-series change 
of the natural logarithm of the number of bills introduced by politicians in a state, 
ΔLNBILLNUM. I follow Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) to clean up the Trace 
database to avoid liquidity bias and follow Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012) to 
compute monthly bond returns using trade-weighted prices. My dependent variable is the 
monthly equal-weighted return (RET) at the state level. I also use an alternative dependent 
variable, RET-RF, which is constructed by subtracting the one month T-bill rate from the 
monthly return. I control for state and month fixed effects in my regressions. Table 9 presents my 
empirical results. I find that all three measures of policy risk are positively and significantly 
correlated with both monthly bond returns and return spreads, implying that when local 
politicians inject uncertainty to their home state through legislative activities, bond investors 
demand higher returns to bear the additional risk.  
                                                          
27
 I use the bond illiquidity measure for the market constructed by Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando 
(2012). 
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 Table 9: Monthly Bond Returns 
 
This table presents pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of policy risk on monthly bond returns at the 
state-level collected from Trace over 2002 to 2009. The dependent variables are RET or RET – RF. RET is the 
monthly equally-weighted bond return at the state level, and RET – RF is the monthly equally-weighted bond return 
minus the one-month T-bill rate. PAI is the political alignment index, and ΔPAI is the change of the political 
alignment index from time t-1 to time t. ΔLNBILLNUM is the time-series change of the log of the number of bills 
introduced by politicians in a state. I collect the Fama-French three factors MKTRF, SMB, and HML from Ken 
French’s website. DEFAULT SPREAD (%) is computed as the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA 
corporate bond yields from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). TERM SPREAD (%) is calculated as the 
difference in yields between the thirty-year Treasury bond and the one-month Treasury bill. AMIHUD BOND 
ILLIQUIDITY is provided by Jens Dick-Nielsen on his website. All other variables are defined in Appendix A1. T-
values are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. State 
and month dummies are included but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable RET RET - RF RET RET - RF RET RET - RF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0491 0.0406** 0.0489 0.0275 0.0220 0.0006 
 
(0.87) (2.00) (0.87) (0.49) (0.37) (0.01) 
PAI 0.0097** 0.0096* 
    
 
(2.14) (1.86) 
    ΔPAI  
  
0.0077** 0.0077** 
  
   
(2.56) (2.56) 
  ΔLNBILLNUM 
    
0.0026* 0.0026* 
     
(1.85) (1.85) 
MKTRF 0.4043** 0.2858*** 0.4067** 0.4070** 0.3189* 0.3193* 
 
(2.29) (11.46) (2.30) (2.31) (1.76) (1.76) 
SMB 0.7001*** -0.1709*** 0.6796*** 0.7377*** 0.8169*** 0.8749*** 
 
(2.90) (-5.18) (2.81) (3.05) (3.28) (3.52) 
HML 1.4872*** 0.1083*** 1.4718*** 1.4684*** 1.4872*** 1.4838*** 
 
(5.82) (2.68) (5.76) (5.75) (5.84) (5.83) 
DEFAULT SPREAD (%) -0.0266* 0.0149*** -0.0252* -0.0262* -0.0249* -0.0259* 
 
(-1.78) (4.36) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.67) (-1.73) 
TERM SPREAD (%) -0.0148 -0.0201*** -0.0152 -0.0110 -0.0099 -0.0057 
 
(-1.52) (-6.34) (-1.56) (-1.13) (-0.98) (-0.56) 
AMIHUD BOND ILLIQUIDITY 0.0031 -0.0128*** 0.0028 0.0049 0.0020 0.0042 
 
(0.48) (-6.90) (0.43) (0.77) (0.32) (0.66) 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 0.3633*** 0.2630** 0.4085*** 0.4085*** 0.3511 0.3511 
 
(2.89) (1.90) (3.22) (3.22) (0.01) (0.01) 
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE 0.0233 0.0199 0.0273 0.0273 0.0158 0.0158 
 
(0.70) (0.52) (0.81) (0.81) (0.64) (0.64) 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2388 2388 2388 2388 2368 2368 
R2 0.3914 0.1885 0.3919 0.3945 0.3876 0.3899 
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Chapter Five: Corporate Political Strategies and Yield Spreads 
  In the previous chapter I provided evidence indicating that higher policy risk is associated 
with higher costs of debt. In this chapter, my aim is to determine whether corporate political 
strategies can effectively shield bond issuing firms from policy risk. 
  In Table 10, I divide my sample based on whether firms actively make campaign 
contributions and/or lobby. The sample for the group of lobbying issuers is confined to the 
November 2000 to October 2008 period, for which the full set of lobbying data is available. 
While corporate political strategies might help to hedge against policy risk, it is plausible that, 
for example, larger firms or firms with better performance are more likely to make political 
contributions or engage in lobbying. These firms are likely to have higher credit ratings and 
lower yields. Thus, it is imperative that I control for observable and unobservable characteristics 
that may jointly influence firms’ political strategies and their cost of debt. As a first step in this 
direction, rather than using contribution or lobbying as exogenous explanatory variables, I divide 
my sample into four different groups: firms not contributing to PACs, PAC contributing firms, 
non-lobbying firms, and lobbying firms. I estimate models similar to Model 6 separately for each 
one of these four subsamples. I reason that if PAC contributions or lobbying are effective 
hedging strategies against policy risk, I should not observe a significant impact of PAI on yield 
spreads for contributing or lobbying firms.  
  The first column in Table 10 shows that for firms that do not make PAC contributions 
and also do not lobby, the impact of PAI on yield spreads is positive and significant. Columns (2) 
and (3) show the impact of PAI on yield spreads is insignificant for firms that make PAC 
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contributions, but positive and significant for firms that do not. These results are consistent with 
the notion that PAC contributions seem to protect firms from political uncertainty. I observe 
similar results for non-lobbying firms and lobbying firms. PAI is positively related to yield 
spreads for non-lobbying firms, but the impact of PAI on yield spreads disappears for lobbying 
firms. Overall, these results imply that both PAC contributions and lobbying can be effective 
hedging tools against political uncertainty.  
Table 10: Corporate Political Strategies 
 
This table presents analysis on the relation between policy risk and yield spreads using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. The dependent variable, Yield Spread (%), is the percentage yield spread calculated as the difference 
between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a treasury security with similar maturity. PAI is the 
political alignment index. Column (1) presents estimates for non-contribution issuers and non-lobbying issuers. 
Columns (2) and (3) present estimates for non-contribution issuers and contribution issuers, respectively. Columns 
(4) and (5) present estimates for non-lobbying issuers and lobbying issuers, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A1. Firm control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below 
the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but 
not reported. z-values are in square brackets where clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping 
procedure with 200 replications. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Yield Spread (%) 
 
Non-Contribution 
& Non-Lobbying  
Issuers 
Non-Contribution 
Issuers 
Contribution 
Issuers 
Non-Lobbying 
Issuers Lobbying Issuers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
PAI 0.596* 0.596** 0.258* 0.258** 0.110 0.110 0.591** 0.591*** -0.035 -0.035 
 (1.88) (2.06) (1.92) (2.40) (1.02) (1.37) (2.40) (2.67) (-0.18) (-0.23) 
 
[1.76] [1.97] [1.96] [2.59] [1.05] [1.40] [2.12] [2.57] [-0.18] [-0.22] 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Cluster Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
N 
693 
0.8185 
2430 
0.7009 
3222 
0.5324 
959 
0.8137 
1360 
0.7110 R2 
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Matched Benchmarks  
  As previously shown in Table 3, firms with active corporate political strategies are 
different from those without such strategies in terms of several characteristics. For example, firm 
size of issuers that lobby and/or make contributions is substantially larger, on average, than that 
of non-lobbying issuers and/or non-contribution issuers. Thus, it might be that the hedging effect 
of corporate political strategies such as lobbying or making PAC contributions is just a size 
effect. In order to mitigate such endogeneity concerns, I compare the yield spreads of lobbying 
issuers and a matching sample of non-lobbying issuers based on size, book-to-market, and 
momentum. I identify all matched non-lobbying issuers for the sample of lobbying issuers that 
fall into the same size, book-to-market, and momentum (3 x 3 x 3) sorted portfolio following 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).  
Table 11: Matched Benchmarks’ Comparison of Yield Spreads 
 
This table provides mean and median yield spreads for contributing issuers and their matched non-contribution 
benchmarks and lobbying issuers and their matched non-lobbying benchmarks with similar maturities. I identify 
benchmark issuers if they are located in the same industry and in the same size, book to market ratio, and 
momentum (3x3x3) portfolios as contributing or lobbying issuers. The portfolios are constructed using a similar 
approach following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). I compare firm and controls for high (panel A) 
and low (panel B) terciles in changes in the PAI index (ΔPAI). Corresponding p-values from means tests (one-sided 
p-values from medians test) are reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: High ΔPAI  
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
Contribution Issuers 163 1.22 0.90 Lobbying Issuers 89 1.74 1.47 
Non-contribution Issuers 161 1.43 1.11 Non-lobbying Issuers 78 2.07 1.67 
Difference 
 
-0.21* -0.21** Difference 
 
-0.33* -0.20* 
p-value   (0.056) (0.030) p-value   (0.078) (0.095) 
Panel B: Low ΔPAI  
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
Contribution Issuers 131 1.36 1.14 Lobbying Issuers 75 1.86 1.73 
Non-contribution Issuers 142 1.56 1.23 Non-lobbying Issuers 63 2.06 1.73 
Difference 
 
-0.20 -0.09 Difference 
 
-0.20 0.00 
p-value   (0.152) (0.292) p-value   (0.304) (0.500) 
  In Table 11, I divide my sample based on terciles in the change in the PAI index. My 
results show that in states with large and positive changes in PAI (Panel A), PAC contributing 
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issuers have significantly lower yield spreads compared with their control firms, implying that 
size, growth and momentum are not the only factors that contribute to the lower borrowing costs 
for PAC contributing issuers when they are exposed to higher policy uncertainty. I find the same 
results for lobbying versus non-lobbying issuers. When the change in PAI is small, I find little 
difference between contributing and non-contributing or lobbying and non-lobbying firm yield 
spreads.  
Political Networks and Lobbying Intensity 
  In this section, I consider whether contributions geared toward supporting better 
connected politicians in Congress are a more effective tool of dealing with policy risk. I 
hypothesize that firms could extract incremental benefits from supporting politicians who have 
stronger positions within the legislative co-sponsorship network in Congress because they would 
be in better position to pass legislation (and/or amendments) or implement regulations that are 
beneficial to firms they receive support from, essentially shielding such firms from the 
potentially adverse impact of new legislation, i.e. from policy risk. In order to test this 
conjecture, I estimate multivariate models that control for other determinants of yield spreads, as 
well as for the fact that firms may self-select in issuing bonds.  
  In order to develop measures of a firm’s political connections to politicians, I merge 
Fowler’s (2006) legislative co-sponsorship network data with firms’ PAC contribution profiles 
by a politician’s unique ID, which allow me to identify whom firms support in the legislative 
network. Fowler (2006) proposes several social network measures such as closeness, eigenvector 
centrality, and connectedness to assess how well an individual politician is connected to other 
legislators in the legislative network.
28
 Closeness is the social distance from one politician to the 
                                                          
28
 Fowler (2006) uses all bills proposed in Congress and draws a directional link between politicians who 
sponsor and cosponsor a particular bill for the period from 1973 to 2004.  The measures are computed using 
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other, and it indicates how much support one politician can receive from other politicians as well 
as how much support the politician’s supporters can receive from others in the legislative 
network. Eigenvector centrality shows the magnitude of direct support that an individual 
politician can receive from other politicians in the network. Connectedness measures the strength 
of the social connections of a politician in the legislative network, and it also gauges the level of 
a politician’s legislative influence in drafting, gathering support for and passing new bills. Both 
the centrality measure and the connectedness measure identify majority leaders, minority leaders, 
and committee chairs.  
  In this study, I aggregate each of the closeness, eigenvector centrality, and connectedness 
measures across all politicians supported by a firm to assess a firm’s ability to benefit by its 
proximity to political power of Congress. I expect that the better the connections a firm has in 
Congress, the greater its ability to hedge against policy risk. The three firm-level measures of 
firm i’s political network strength are as follows: 
                          ∑            
 
      (4) 
where             is the closeness score of a politician who received a sponsoring firm i’s 
contribution in election cycle t. 
                ∑                         
 
                  (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
information related to the number of bills sponsored and cosponsored by legislators, the number of legislators 
cosponsoring a particular bill, the number of legislators cosponsoring bills sponsored by a particular legislator, and 
so on. Take the closeness measure for example, the distance between a sponsor and his/her cosponsors is one, and 
the distance is two between the sponsor and his/her cosponsors’ cosponsors. The closeness score takes the average 
inverse value of the distance score assigned to each legislator. The eigenvector centrality is computed as the 
proportional sum of the centrality scores of the legislators who cosponsor the legislator’s bills using an eigenvector 
centrality algorithm. Connectedness is calculated as the inverse of the shortest distance from one legislator to other 
legislators.    
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where                          is the centrality score of a politician who received a 
sponsoring firm i’s contribution at election cycle t.  
                              ∑                
 
                 (6) 
where                 is the connectedness score of a politician who received a sponsoring 
firm i’s contribution at election cycle t. 
 Table 12: Political Networks and Lobbying Intensity 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of policy risk on yield spread based on the strength of 
political networks and lobbying intensity. The dependent variable, Yield Spread (%), is the percentage yield spread 
calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a treasury security with similar 
maturity. PAI is the political alignment index. The strength of political networks is measured based on ranks of the 
CLOSENESS, CENTRALITY, and CONNECTEDNESS measures constructed using Fowler’s Co-sponsorship 
Network Data. Weak (Strong) Political Networks refers to the group of bond issuers that are located in the lowest 
(highest) quintile ranks of these measures. Lobbying Intensity is measured as the total amount of lobbying 
expenditures by a firm scaled by the total assets each year. Low (high) Lobbying Intensity refers to bond issuers 
located in the bottom (top) quintile of the lobbying intensity measure. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A1. Firm control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.t-values are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but not 
reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable YIELD SPREAD (%) 
  
Weak Political 
Networks 
Strong Political 
Networks 
Low Lobbying 
Intensity 
High Lobbying 
Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PAI 2.563*  0.156  13.911**  -2.611  
 
(1.93)  (0.03)  (2.17)  (-0.63)  
PAI*LNMKTCAP  0.263  -0.062  -1.217  0.276  
 (-1.55)  (-0.13)  (-1.94)  (0.64)  
ΔPAI  1.987*  -0.296  0.871*  -0.532 
  (1.91)  (-0.09)  (1.67)  (-1.45) 
ΔPAI *LNMKTCAP  -0.248**  -0.010  0.041  0.048 
  (-2.03)  (-0.03)  (0.50)  (0.76) 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 499 499 495 495 270 270 270 270 
R2 0.9059 0.9056 0.4402 0.4448 0.8961 0.8947 0.9219 0.9230 
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   In the first two columns of Table 12, I divide firms into quintile groups formed after 
sorting CLOSENESS, CENTRALITY, and CONNECTEDNESS measures of politician influence 
in the legislative co-sponsorship network of the U.S. Congress. I use subsamples of issuers 
assigned to the top and bottom quintile groups after sorting on the aforementioned political 
network measures and compare whether yield spreads of firms with strong political network 
measures are significantly different from those of firms with weak political network measures. I 
find that PAI (ΔPAI) is positively related to YIELD SPREAD only in the regressions using the 
subsamples of issuers with weak political networks, whereas the PAI (ΔPAI) coefficients are 
insignificant using the subsamples of issuers with strong political networks. The results support 
the view that the effectiveness of campaign contributions as corporate political strategies also 
depends on whom firms support. By supporting influential, well-connected politicians in the 
congressional networks, firms can effectively hedge against policy risk.  
In prior tests, I showed that lobbying activity helps firms reduce the impact of policy risk 
on the cost of debt. In this section, I explore if the intensity of lobbying is important in 
determining the degree to which lobbying firms can hedge against political uncertainty. I use 
annual lobbying expenses scaled by the total assets to assess the intensity of firms’ lobbying 
activities. In columns (3) and (4), I test whether the impact of PAI (ΔPAI) on yield spreads varies 
with the intensity of lobbying activities by comparing a subsample of issuers located in the 
bottom quintile of lobbying expenses and a subsample of issuers located in the top quintile of 
lobbying expenses. I find that the effect of PAI (ΔPAI) on yield spreads is positive and 
significant in the lowest quintile of lobbying expenditures, but becomes insignificant in the 
highest quintile. These results are consistent with the view that the impact of policy risk is 
minimized for firms that spend more on lobbying.  
44 
 
Two-Stage Least-Squares Model 
  My tests related to corporate political strategies are potentially subject to one serious 
econometric problem—selection bias. Firms might self-select to participate in political activities 
based on unobserved characteristics which can also affect the amount of PAC contributions and 
(or) lobbying expenses and thus corporate bond ratings and yield spreads. To account for these 
concerns, I conduct Tobit two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions following Maddala (1986), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), among others. In the first stage, I run a reduced form Tobit 
regression with instrumental variables to get the predicted values of PAC contributions and 
lobbying expenses using all Compustat firms. In the second stage, I use these predicted values as 
independent variables and run OLS regressions to predict yield spreads and ordered logit models 
to predict corporate bond rating. The 2SLS model requires exclusion restriction, so I exclude the 
key instrument variables used in the first stage but include all other control variables from the 
first stage which I think might affect yield spreads in the second stage. Standard errors in square 
brackets reported in Table 13 are bootstrapped standard errors using a bootstrapping procedure 
with 200 replications.
29
 Appendix A4 shows the results from the first-stage Tobit regressions.  
  The key instrumental variable I use to predict the amount of firms’ PAC contributions 
during an election cycle is (TIGHT ELECTION (Senate)), an indicator variable equal to one if it 
is a tight state senatorial election.
30
 I expect that firms contribute more to politicians when the 
competition among candidates is fierce. Other control variables are averaged across the two-year 
election cycles. P_RELCONAMT in Table 13 is computed as the predicted dollar amount of a 
firm’s predicted contributions scaled by the predicted industry total for a two-year election cycle. 
My results show that the lag of the predicted contribution amount, P_RELCONAMT, is 
                                                          
29
 Similar to Footnote 18, I estimate bond ratings using OLS models for the bootstrapped standard errors.  
30
 I define TIGHT ELECTION (Senate) as a dummy which is one for a state if the margin in popular vote by 
percentage is within -2.5% and +2.5% for a presidential election and zero otherwise.  
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negatively and significantly related to YIELD SREAD (%), suggesting that firms making PAC 
contributions have a lower cost of debt. It implies that a 10 percent increase in the contribution 
amount related to the industry total can reduce YIELD SREAD (%) by about 9 basis points 
holding everything else constant. The coefficient of the interaction term between the PAI index 
and P_RELCONAMT is negative and insignificant, implying that firms can protect against the 
impact of policy risk on their cost of debt through PAC contributions. For the analysis of bond 
ratings, I find that for firms exposed to higher policy risk, Moody’s corporate bond ratings are 
higher for firms if they increase their PAI contributions.    
  When I focus on lobbying, I use the lagged RELLOBEXP, the relative lobbying 
expenditures scaled by the total industry lobbying expenditure, as my key instrument to predict 
firms’ annual lobbying expenditures. I also follow Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Van Ness (2011) 
and use CAPITALDUM (an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is 
headquartered in a state capital) as another instrumental variable. Table 13 shows that predicted 
lobbying expenditures (P_RELLOBEXP), computed as a firm’s predicted lobbying expenditures 
in dollars divided by the predicted industry total in the previous year, are negatively related to 
yield spreads. The coefficient of P_RELLOBEXP is -0.426 and significant. The yield spread is 
about 8 basis points lower for a firm to increase their lobbying expenditures by 20% relative to 
the industry total. The coefficient of the interaction term between the PAI index and 
P_RELLOBEXP is negative. These results imply that the impact of policy risk on firms’ cost of 
debt is reduced or diminished for firms spending heavily on lobbying. The results are consistent 
with corporate bond ratings.  
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Table 13: 2SLS Model 
 
This table reports the relation between political contributions, lobbying expenses, and yield spreads (and corporate 
bond ratings) applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) models. The results are obtained from the OLS regressions in 
the second stage of the 2SLS model. The dependent variable, YIELD SPREAD (%), is the percentage yield spread 
calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity of an issue and the yield of a treasury security with similar 
maturity. Moody’s Ratings are rescaled Moody’s rating score. P_RELCONAMT is the predicted contribution 
amount scaled by predicted industry total for the past two-year election cycle. P_RELLOBEXP is the predicted 
annual lobbying expenses scaled by predicted industry total in year t-1.All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A1. Firm control variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%.Other control variables except main 
instruments used in the first stage are also included but not reported. t-values are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Industry, state, and year dummies are included but not 
reported. z-values are in square brackets where clustered standard errors are computed using bootstrapping 
procedure with 200 replications. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Contribution  Lobbying  
Dependent Variable Yield Spread (%) 
Moody’s 
Ratings Yield Spread (%) 
Moody’s 
Ratings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAI 0.251*** 0.310*** -0.217*** 0.266* 0.335** -0.044 
 (3.19) (3.27) (-2.85) (1.83) (2.15) (-0.38) 
 
[2.86] [2.96] [-2.78] [1.91] [1.87] [-0.34] 
P_RELCONAMT -0.872** -0.578* -0.094 
  
 
 (-2.83) (-1.69) (-0.38)  
 
[-2.47] [-1.45] [-0.32] 
  
 
PAI*P_RELCONAMT 
 
-0.786 1.570*** 
  
 
 (-1.43) (3.82)  
  
[-1.11] [2.92] 
  
 
P_RELLOBEXP 
  
 -0.426** 0.080 -0.345 
  (-2.31) (0.24) (-1.50) 
   
 [-1.77] [0.15] [-1.08] 
PAI*P_RELLOBEXP 
  
 
 
-0.834* 0.672** 
  (-1.69)          (2.04) 
   
 
 
[-1.16] [1.56] 
Bond Issue Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Election Cycle Fix Effects Y Y Y 
  
 
Year Fix Effects 
  
 Y Y Y 
State Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fix Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4851 4851 4851 2063 2063 2063 
R2 0.5946 0.5946 0.7066 0.7468 0.7469 0.7679 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
  Using a sample of new corporate bond issues, I find that policy uncertainty can positively 
predict yield spreads and negatively predict corporate bond ratings after I control for default risk. 
My proxy for policy risk is the degree of political alignment along party lines between state 
politicians and the president. The closer the political alignment, the more opportunities there are 
for local politicians to shape the political agenda and influence future policies that affect firms 
located in their home states.  Consequently, these firms become more exposed to policy risk 
since new policies or regulations are more likely to originate from and be targeted toward firms 
in states with greater partisan alignment with the president. I also use alternative measures like 
the number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from a firms’ home state, the change in 
the number of bills introduced over the past year, and the percentage of bills that ultimately 
become law. My results indicate that all measures of policy risk are positively correlated with 
firms’ cost of debt, suggesting that bondholders’ financial claims are contingent on firms’ 
political environment.  
  I examine whether firms can devise corporate political strategies that can be effective in 
terms of hedging against policy risk. Specifically, I study firms’ political action campaign (PAC) 
contributions and lobbying activities. I find that both political contributions and active lobbying 
are effective tools firms can use for hedging policy risk. The impact of policy risk on yield 
spreads disappears when firms target their PAC contributions toward more influential politicians 
or when firms spend heavily on lobbying. These findings imply that the degree of protection 
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depends on the relative influence of the recipients of firms’ PAC contributions and the depth of 
firms’ lobbying reach.  
  By providing novel and comprehensive empirical evidence on the impact of exposure to 
policy risk on firms’ cost of debt and on the effectiveness of firms’ corporate political strategies 
in hedging against policy risk, my study offers important insights that can be helpful to investors, 
bond rating agencies, and policy makers and has indirect implications on explaining the credit 
spread puzzle.  
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Appendix A1: Description of Variable Construction 
 
Variable Name  Description 
Panel A Bond issue characteristics and description 
MSCORE  Moody's rescaled rating score ranging from 1 to 7. 
SPSCORE S&P rescaled rating score ranging from 1 to 7. 
YIELD SPREAD (%) 
The difference between the yield to maturity and treasury bonds with similar maturity 
obtained from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
PROCEEDS ($M) Gross proceeds of bond issues. 
RELPROCEEDS Gross proceeds scaled by total assets. 
MATURITY The maturity of the issue. 
LNMATURITY The natural logarithm of the maturity of the issue. 
SHELF A dummy which is one if the issue is shelf registered and zero otherwise.  
DEFAULT SPREAD (%) 
The default spread computed as the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate 
bond yields from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
TERM SPREAD (%) 
The difference in yields between the thirty-year Treasury bond and the one-month Treasury 
bill. 
Panel B Firm characteristics and description  
MKTCAP  
Market capitalization at the end of fiscal year calculated as the price at the end of fiscal year 
multiplied by total shares outstanding. 
LNMKTCAP The natural logarithm of market capitalization in millions. 
AGE 
Firm age is computed using the firm's founding date from Jay Ritter's website. In cases 
where founding date is missing, the earliest date on CRSP database is used.  
LNAGE The natural logarithm of firm age. 
ROA Net income over total assets. 
ICR  
The sum of operating income before depreciation and interest expense of long-term debt 
divided by interest expense of long-term debt. ICR1 to ICR4 are computed following Huang, 
Ritter, and Zhang (2012).  
DEBT RATIO Long-term debt plus current debt over total assets. 
MB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
LNMB The logarithm of market-to-book ratio. 
BHRET The buy-and-hold market-adjusted return within one-year before the issue date. 
RETVOL The standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. 
BETA  
Beta is estimated with the market model using daily returns around one year before the issue 
date. 
IDIO_RISK The mean standard error of residual returns estimated with the market model. 
TANGIBILITY Total net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets 
LNAMIHUD 
The natural logarithm of annual Amihud (2002) Illiquidity measure computed as 
1000000*abs(return)/(abs(price)*volume); 
RELGOVSALE Sales to U.S. government scaled by total sales to all customers. 
MKTSHR  Firm's sales scaled by total industry sales. 
LNBUSSEG The natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s business segments. 
LNGEOSEG The natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s geographic segments. 
FCF Firm’s free cash flows divided by total assets 
GROWTH Firm’s capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
NET PROFIT MARGIN Firm’s net income divided by total sales. 
ALTMAN’S Z SCORE 
Computed as 1.2(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 
(EBIT/total assets) + 0.6(total market capitalization/book value of total liabilities)+ 
0.999(sales/total assets) 
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Panel C Industry characteristics and description 
HHI_SALES 
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index computed with sales information where industry groups 
take the first two-digit historical SIC codes from Compustat. 
RELINDPAC 
The number of Political Action Committees scaled by the number of firms in an industry by 
the first two-digit historical SIC codes from Compustat. 
RELINDLOB 
The number of lobbying firms scaled by the number of firms in an industry by the first two-
digit historical SIC codes from Compustat. 
RELLOBEXP A firm’s lobbying expenses divided by the total industry lobbying expenses. 
REGDUM 
A dummy which is one for financial firms (SIC codes 60-69) or utility firms (SIC codes 40-
49) and zero otherwise. 
UTILITY A dummy which is one for utility firms (SIC codes 40-49) and zero otherwise. 
PCTMEM The percentage of employees who are also union members in an industry.  
Panel D State characteristics  
BILLNUM 
The number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from a given state, where the bill 
information is collected from E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project 
(1984-2008). 
PLAWNUM 
The number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from a given state that finally 
became law, where the bill information is collected from E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, 
Congressional Bills Project (1984-2008). 
RBENEFIT_SALES 
The concentration of firms that depend on government spending in a state computed using 
sales information.  
CONVICTION RATE 
The conviction rate in percentage, which is the number of convictions dividend by the 
population of the state (in millions).  Related information is collected from the U.S. 
Department of Justice Public Integrity Section (http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/) and U.S. 
Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov). 
CAPITALDUM 
A dummy which is one if a firm's headquarter is located in the state capital and zero 
otherwise, where firms’ historical headquarters are collected from Compact Disclosure. 
TIGHT ELECTION (Senate) 
A dummy which is one for a state if the margin in popular vote by percentage is within -
2.5% to +2.5% for a senatorial election.  
STATE GDP GROWTH RATE 
The annual state GDP growth rate computed using state GDP from Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  
PERSONAL INCOME The state annual personal income (percent of US) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE The annual unemployment rate from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
Panel E Political index and corporate political strategies 
PAI  
The political alignment index constructed by Kim et al. (2011) at the state level. Refer to the 
text for detailed information on the construction of this index.  
PACDUM 
A dummy which is one if a firm has an established political action committee in year t and 
zero otherwise. 
CONTRDUM  
A dummy which is one if the issuer makes a contribution from November 1st of year t-3 to 
October 31st of year t and zero otherwise. 
CONAMT($M) The amount of PAC contributions made by a contributing firm for a general election cycle.  
LOBDUM (From 2001) 
A dummy which is one if the issuer engages in lobbying in the previous year and zero 
otherwise. 
LOBEXP ($M, from 2001) A firm's annual lobbying expenses. 
CLOSENESS 
The sum of closeness scores related to all politicians supported by a firm from November 1st 
year t-1 to October 31st year t, where closeness scores are from Fowler's Cosponsorship 
Data. 
CENTRALITY 
The sum of eigenvector centrality scores related to all politicians supported by a firm from 
November 1st year t-1 to October 31st year t, where eigenvector centrality scores are from 
Fowler's Cosponsorship Data. 
CONNECTEDNESS 
The sum of connectedness scores related to all politicians supported by a firm from 
November 1st year t-1 to October 31st year t where connectedness scores are from Fowler’s 
Cosponsorship Data. 
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Appendix A2: Bond Ratings Conversion Scheme 
This table provides the conversion scheme between letter rating scores and numerical rating scores for both 
Moody’s and S&P. The rescaled scores are the scores I use in my analysis.  
 
Moody's S&P Rating Score Rescaled Score Grade Category 
Aaa AAA 21 7 INVESTMENT 
Aa1 AA+ 20 6 INVESTMENT 
Aa& Aa2 AA 19 6 INVESTMENT 
Aa3 AA- 18 6 INVESTMENT 
A1 A+ 17 5 INVESTMENT 
A & A2 A 16 5 INVESTMENT 
A3 A- 15 5 INVESTMENT 
Baa1 BBB+ 14 4 INVESTMENT 
Baa & Baa2 BBB 13 4 INVESTMENT 
Baa3 BBB- 12 4 INVESTMENT 
Ba1 BB+ 11 3 SPECULATIVE 
Ba & Ba2 BB 10 3 SPECULATIVE 
Ba3 BB- 9 3 SPECULATIVE 
B1 B+ 8 2 SPECULATIVE 
B & B2 B 7 2 SPECULATIVE 
B3 B- 6 2 SPECULATIVE 
Caa1 CCC+ 5 1 SPECULATIVE 
Caa& Caa2 CCC 4 1 SPECULATIVE 
Caa3 CCC- 3 1 SPECULATIVE 
Ca CC 2 1 SPECULATIVE 
C C 1 1 SPECULATIVE 
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Appendix A3: Bond Issues Probit Model  
This table presents results from the probit model to estimate the probability for a firm to issue a straight corporate 
bond for the period from 1984 to 2009 using the sample of all Compustat firms except financials (four-digit SIC 
code 6000-6999). I follow Butler and Wan (2010) and estimate the model as such: Bond Issue Choice (0 or 1) = 
f(ΔPAI,ΔLNBILLNUM, LNAMIHUD, GROWTH, NET PROFIT MARGIN, LNMKTCAP, LNAGE, 
DIVIDEND_PAYER, LNMB, DEBT RATIO, ALTMAN’S Z-SCORE, TANGIBILITY, BHRET, RETVOL, State, 
Industry, and Election Cycle Fixed Effects).The dependent variable is an indicator variable which is one if a firm 
issued a bond in a given year and zero otherwise. All the other variables are as defined in Appendix A1 and 
winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%. Inverse Mills Ratio Bond Issue is the inverse Mills ratio for bond issues 
obtained from the first probit model below.  
 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
 
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -5.149 0.000 -5.091 0.000 
ΔPAI -0.075 0.094   
ΔLNBILLNUM 
  
-0.059 0.000 
LNAMIHUD -0.048 0.000 -0.050 0.000 
GROWTH 1.032 0.000 1.035 0.000 
NET PROFIT MARGIN 0.038 0.058 0.036 0.062 
LNMKTCAP 0.346 0.000 0.343 0.000 
LNAGE 0.048 0.000 0.048  
DIVIDEND_PAYER 0.178 0.000 0.177  
LNMB -0.172 0.000 -0.172 0.000 
DEBTRATIO 1.077 0.000 1.082 0.000 
ALTMAN'S Z-SCORE -4.306 0.000 -4.306 0.000 
TANGIBILITY 0.172 0.025 0.167 0.029 
BHRET 0.024 0.273 0.033 0.131 
IDIO_RISK -1.975 0.092 -1.939 0.098 
Election Cycle Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
State Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
N 111666 
 
111666  
Pseudo R2   0.3665 
 
0.3670  
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Appendix A4: First Stage Tobit Model 
 
This table reports results from the first stage Tobit model of the two-stage regression. TIGHT RACE (Senate) is the 
key instrument variable used in the Tobit model to predict the amount of contributions for every two-year election 
cycle. RELLOBEXPt-1 and CAPITALDUM are the key instrument variables used in the Tobit model to predict 
firms’ annual lobbying expenditures. The dependent variables are measured in millions of dollars. The natural 
logarithm of the predicted dollar values are used in the second stage OLS regressions. For the first model, all the 
control variables are averaged over a two-year election cycle. Please refer to Appendix A1 for variable definitions. 
Industry and time dummies are included but not reported. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Contribution Amount 
(1) 
Lobbying Expenditures 
(2) 
 
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -0.734 0.000 -4.053 0.000 
TIGHT ELECTION (Senate) 0.024 0.001 
  RELINDPAC 0.333 0.000 
  PCTMEM 0.001 0.002 
  RELLOBEXPt-1 
  
7.396 0.000 
CAPITALDUM 
  
0.121 0.026 
RELINDLOB 
  
3.744 0.000 
CONVICTION RATE 
  
1.484 0.096 
RELGOVSALE 0.252 0.000 2.127 0.000 
MKTSHR 0.453 0.000 0.182 0.727 
HHI_SALES 0.070 0.155 -1.454 0.213 
LNBUSSEG 0.018 0.000 0.122 0.000 
LNGEOSEG -0.004 0.138 -0.055 0.001 
LNAGE 0.013 0.000 0.114 0.000 
LNMKTCAP 0.085 0.000 0.591 0.000 
LNMB -0.050 0.000 -0.151 0.000 
DEBT RATIO 0.053 0.000 0.047 0.405 
FCF 0.062 0.000 -0.149 0.000 
REGDUM -0.061 0.340 -3.253 0.000 
Election Cycle Fix Effects Y 
   Year Fix Effects 
  
Y 
 Industry Fix Effects Y 
 
Y 
 N 60239 
 
34527 
 R2 0.1673 
 
0.2663 
  
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A5: Distribution of PAI and the Change in PAI 
 
This table presents summary statistics of PAI and the change in PAI (ΔPAI) based on the tercile distribution of PAI 
and ΔPAI. The number of observations is at the state-year level.  
 
PI 
N Mean Median 
ΔPAI 
N Mean Median 
Terciles Terciles 
1 Low 470 0.19 0.23 1 Low 466 -0.27 -0.25 
2 466 0.45 0.47 2 484 0.00 0.00 
3 High 464 0.76 0.75 3 High 450 0.26 0.25 
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Appendix A6: The Change in PAI and Bond Maturity 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the change in PAI (ΔPAI) and maturity of bond issues based on tercile sort 
of the change in PAI (ΔPAI) at firm-issue level.  
 
ΔPAI # of Issuers # of Issues ΔPAI Maturity 
Terciles Mean Median Mean Median 
1 571 1887 -0.27 -0.25 13 10 
2 435 1470 -0.01 0.00 12 10 
3 659 2295 0.22 0.16 13 10 
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Local Bias in State Pension Funds: Do Political Networks Play a Role? 
Chapter Seven: Introduction 
Studies have shown that there are local biases in investors’ portfolio investments. Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner (2005), Massa and Simonov (2006), and Seasholes and Zhu (2010) find that 
individual investors tend to invest more in stocks that are close to home. Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), and Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010) find evidence on 
institutional investors’ local bias behavior.31 Local bias also exists in common equity (Brown, 
Pollet, and Weisbenner, 2012) and private equity portfolios (Hochberg and Rauh, 2013) of state 
public pension funds. The most common explanations for local bias are the information 
advantage hypothesis and the familiarity hypothesis.  The information advantage hypothesis 
states that local investors can profit from their information advantage about geographically 
proximate firms (Baik, Kang, and Kim, 2010; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). The familiarity 
hypothesis suggests that investors invest in home-state firms because they are more familiar with 
them (Brown et al., 2012). The findings of these studies reach different conclusions on why 
investors exhibit strong local biases. 
In this paper, I examine the factors that might contribute to local bias mainly from a 
political perspective and analyze whether firms’ political connections and networks are related to 
local bias and under-diversification in local investors’ portfolio investments. Furthermore, I 
                                                          
31
 These studies such as Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), and Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) also find that money managers have a strong domestic bias in their portfolio 
investments. Cumming and Dai (2010) find that certain venture capital investments also exhibit a local bias. Malloy 
(2005) suggests that local affiliated analysts have an information advantage about local stocks and perform better 
than non-local affiliated analysts. 
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explore whether state-level political networks, as part of the social networks, can explain this 
phenomenon.
32
 
I conduct my analysis using a sample of public equity holdings in state public pension 
funds internally managed by trustees. One difference between state public pension funds and 
actively managed mutual funds is that trustees of state pension funds, particularly internally-
managed funds, have asset allocation and portfolio construction discretion over external 
managers. More interestingly, some trustees are appointed by state governors or are ex-officios 
who have official positions in state public sectors. The appointed trustees serve the interests of 
state governors and local politicians.
33
 
There are also substantial conflicts of interest in the public pension sector. For example, 
the public has scrutinized the recent state pension fund scandals, referred as pay-to-play practices 
between pension fund advisors and state politicians. These scandals appeared in the media first 
and finally draw regulators’ attention. On June 30, 2010, the SEC issued Rule 206(4)-5 under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Rule”) that “prohibits an investment adviser from 
providing advisory services for compensation to a government client for two years after the 
adviser or certain of its executives or employees make a contribution to certain elected officials 
or candidates.”34 This suggests that political ties or political connections have contributed to 
business relations in the pension business over the past.  
                                                          
32
 Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) find that mutual funds tend to overweight stocks of firms in which 
they have board connections through educational networks.  
33
 For example, Missouri State Employees' Retirement System (MOSERS) had 10 trustees on the board in 
2011.  Among them, two were senators, two were House representatives, two were appointed by the governor, and 
two were ex-officio members. 
34
 On June 30, 2011, the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed charges on several 
companies for bribing state pension funds to buy their stocks. For more details about the charges, please go to this 
website: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-138.htm. Johnson-Skinner (2009) suggests that lawyers use 
campaign contributions to support leaders of state pension funds in order to get counseling business.  
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In my study, I question whether trustees of public pension funds with strong political ties 
carry this feature into asset allocations and whether local firms’ political investments could 
influence trustees’ stock selection and holding decisions. Specifically, I test the conjecture that 
public pension funds over-allocate home-state stocks with connections to local politicians. I 
construct two measures of local political connection bias: local PAC contributions and local 
lobbying. I find that from 1999 to 2009, the average value-weighted local equity bias in state 
pension funds is about 0.26 relative to the market portfolio, implying that state pension funds 
invest 26% more in local stocks compared with what a market portfolio predicts. The average 
local contribution bias is about 23%, so compared to the weight of firms making campaign 
contributions in the market, the average weight of local firms making contributions in state 
pension funds is about 23% higher. The average local lobbying bias is 17%, and this suggests 
that the average overweighting of local firms engaged in lobbying activities is about 17% higher 
compared to what a market portfolio would predict. The correlation between local bias and local 
contribution bias is 0.56, and the correlation between local bias and local lobbying bias is 0.65, 
both of which are highly significant.  
If fund trustees are making rational decisions, they will invest in stocks that perform at 
least similarly to alternatives and have a positive contribution to their portfolio performance. 
This proposition is based on the assumption that fund trustees know more information about 
these firms and could make relatively more accurate investment decisions. Another possibility is 
that state pension fund trustees (or managers) can be tipped by firms’ CEOs or managers through 
social connections. Therefore, they could know more information about the firm than outsiders 
do. In this way, pension funds are still able to profit from the private information they collect 
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through social networks. The information advantage hypothesis predicts that local bias has 
positive contribution to fund performance, but my evidence does not support this hypothesis.
35
 
I compare the performance of local firms held by state pension funds with their local 
benchmarks not held by these funds from the same industry matched by size and book equity to 
market equity ratio. I then place local firms held by state pension funds and their local 
benchmarks not held by these funds into three groups based on the following characteristics: not 
politically connected, politically connected through PAC contributions, and politically connected 
through lobbying. I find that politically connected local firms underperform their local 
benchmarks in the pre-holding period but their performance improves during the holding period. 
This finding suggests past performance cannot explain why state pension funds favor these 
politically connected stocks; however, politically connected local firms might benefit from being 
held by these big institutional investors.
36
 
My multivariate analysis examines the role that local bias plays in explaining the 
performance of state pension funds. I show that local bias in general does not impact fund 
performance significantly. However, local contribution bias and local lobbying bias are 
negatively and significantly related to pension fund performance.
37
 Though Cooper, Gulen, and 
Ovtchinnikov (2010), Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010), and Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Van Ness 
(2011) suggest that politically connected firms outperform non-politically connected firms, my 
                                                          
35
 Brown et al. (2012) suggest that the information advantage hypothesis, the familiarity hypothesis, and the 
non-financial/political hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. My next chapter has detailed discussions on the 
predictions of each hypothesis. The main focus of this paper is to explore alternative explanations of local bias rather 
than to disentangle the differences between familiarity hypothesis and political network hypothesis.  
36
 My evidence might suggest that state pension funds have market-timing skills, but market-timing is a 
short-term tactic and what is more, state pension funds have incentives to invest in poorly performing local firms to 
boost the local economy. This study focuses on the security selection component of state pension fund investment.  
37
 This finding does not conflict with my analysis in the previous paragraph. It suggests that though firms 
held by state pension funds see improvement in their performance during the holding period, the gain is not large 
enough to improve overall fund performance.  
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results imply that the politically connected local firms selected by the state pension funds in my 
sample do not have a positive impact on fund performance. 
I next analyze political and governance characteristics that could influence local bias at 
the state level. I collect the public integrity index from the State Integrity Investigation Project 
which grades the effectiveness of policy and governance mechanisms on many categories such 
as political financing, state pension fund management, ethics enforcement agencies, et cetera. 
My results show that the public integrity index is negatively related to all measures of local bias.  
I also find that political connection bias is stronger when local politicians have stronger 
connections in Congress and thereby are more influential in the congressional network.
38
 My 
findings could also imply that more powerful politicians might be able to impose more political 
pressure on state pensions in returning favors to politically connected firms. However, the level 
of the standard local bias measure is not significantly related to Congressional connections, and 
actually it is much lower in states with high public integrity. Furthermore, there is less 
overweighting of local firms when there are more board trustees elected by state employees or 
retirees, but there is more overweighting of politically connected home-state firms when there 
are more ex-officio trustees on board.  
My evidence suggests that state pension funds are more likely to invest in local firms that 
make direct political investment through political contributions or lobbying. State pension funds 
also tend to invest in large firms and firms with positive earnings surprises and high share 
turnover. I find that even for small and non-local firms that typically draw less attention from big 
                                                          
38
 I use the connectedness measure constructed by Fowler (2006) to assess politicians’ Congressional 
connection. The connectedness index is computed as the inverse of the shortest social distance from one legislator to 
other legislators.   It measures the strength of the political connections of a politician in the legislative network, and 
it also gauges the level of a politician’s legislative influence in drafting, gathering support for and passing new bills. 
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local investors, political connections are still able influence the holding decision of state pension 
funds. My findings are robust after controlling for self-selection bias.  
Finally, I examine the real economic impact of local bias and bias towards politically 
connected local firms by state pension funds through testing the relation between local biases and 
funding levels of state pension funds. My results show that local bias does not contribute to the 
underfunded status of pension funds; however, local contribution bias and local lobbying bias do 
significantly contribute to the underfunded ratios of state pension funds.  
My study attempts to explain why state pension funds, a big component of local 
investors, tend to tilt their stocks toward local firms from the perspective of political and 
governance characteristics and political networks. I offer another angle on examining factors that 
influence asset allocations by managers or trustees of the state public pension funds. My study is 
in line with studies on the relations between politics and investment behavior. For example, 
Bonaparte, Kumar, and Page (2010) suggest that investors are more optimistic when their 
affiliated party aligns with the President, and they tend to invest in more of local stocks when the 
opposite party is in power. Aabo, Pantzalis, and Park (2012) suggest that political interferences 
induce geographic segmentation in the stock market and cause stock prices to exhibit a local 
component. My study also provides insights on why local investors under-diversify their 
portfolio investment.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter Eight presents literature reviews. 
Chapter Nine describes data and summary statistics. Chapter Ten analyzes empirical results, 
followed by a conclusion in Chapter Eleven. 
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Chapter Eight: Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find strong local comovement in returns of local stocks, and 
the local comovement could not be explained by local fundamentals. Despite the existence of 
local comovement and the absence of the impact of local fundamentals, why do local investors 
underdiversify their portfolio? Several studies, such as Brown, et al. (2012), Hochberg and Rauh 
(2013), and Sinclair (2011), find strong local bias in state public pension funds and show that 
state pension funds overweight in-state stocks compared with out-of-state stocks.  
One possible explanation behind state pension funds’ local bias assumes information 
asymmetry. State pension funds have information advantages about in-state stocks compared 
with out-of-state stocks; therefore, if this hypothesis holds, local bias will be positively related to 
portfolio excess returns. The second possible explanation is that local investors tend to invest in 
firms they are more familiar with, and this explanation predicts that local bias might be 
negatively related to pension fund performance or not related to fund performance. Studies also 
suggest that that political pressure might cause public pension funds to support and thus invest 
greater weight in in-state equities. The results from empirical tests on these possible explanations 
are mixed. For example, Brown et al. (2012) support the information advantage hypothesis but 
not the familiarity hypothesis by showing that local stocks outperform non-locals. However, 
Hochberg and Rauh (2013) provide evidence that overweighting in in-state private equity has a 
negative impact on fund performance. Whereas Sinclair (2011) finds that pension fund managers 
have an information advantage about local stocks, he also suggests that political risk and political 
influencing might be related to local bias but does not provide direct evidence.  
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Although the information advantage hypothesis is not novel to studies on local bias, I 
want to examine this hypothesis by taking a different approach from what Brown et al. (2012) do 
in their study. Despite the fact that investors are more familiar with local firms, if information 
advantage still plays the major role in influencing state pension funds’ investment decisions, I 
expect that local firms held by state pension funds should perform better than local firms not held 
by state pension funds, and local firms held by state pension funds should exhibit superior 
performance during the holding period than before or at least should not deteriorate in 
performance.  
Several recent studies suggest that political factors can affect investment behaviors. For 
example, Hong and Kostovetsky (2010) find that mutual fund managers’ political ideology can 
influence the types of stocks they invest in and less conservative managers (those who support 
the Democratic Party) are less likely to invest in socially responsible stocks. Hutton, Jiang, and 
Kumar (2011) suggest that conservative managers, in support of the Republican Party, are more 
conservative in adopting corporate policies and making investments. Bonaparte, Kumar, and 
Page (2010) suggest that investors’ party affiliation can explain some of their investment 
behavior. When the investor’s affiliated party aligns with the President’s, the investor will be 
more optimistic and make risky investments. Brown et al. (2012) find that campaign 
contributions to local politicians by citizens in a county are related to local bias in state pension 
funds. Hochberg and Rauh (2013) imply that political pressure might drive local bias, but they 
do not provide direct evidence.
39
 
I hypothesize that political factors like policy risk and regulation effectiveness are related 
to local bias. Furthermore, I examine local bias from the perspective of social networks. I argue 
that the extent of local politicians’ networks could explain local bias in state pension funds. If 
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 They only show that corruption is related to local bias.  
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local politicians are well-connected in the congressional network and thus are able to pass more 
bill amendments on the floor, they might be able to exert more political pressure on state pension 
funds. These politicians can return favors to these firms that have supported them by offering or 
holding positions in state pension funds. I also conjecture that pension funds are more likely to 
select local firms that have made PAC contributions to the local politicians (or candidates)
40
 or 
local firms that spend a large amount of money in lobbying.
41
 Pension funds might select 
politically connected firms because trustees (or managers) can get some inside information about 
these firms through their social interactions. However, I predict that if the role of political 
connections dominates, the holding decisions of pension funds should not be solely driven by 
past performance.  
 Brown et al. (2012) also suggests that the information advantage, familiarity, and non-
financial/political hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, so the main focus of this study is to 
examine whether political networks is another factor that can explain local bias in state pension 
funds rather than distinguish all three hypotheses.  
Why do firms want to build up political connections? They choose to build up political 
connections so that their shareholders can benefit from state pension funds taking holding 
positions in their firms, particularly for longer period. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) 
                                                          
40
 Even though regulations by Federal Election Committee state that PACs on behalf of organizations, can 
only contribute to each candidate or candidate committee $5,000 during an election, loopholes allow firms to target 
contributions. According to The New York Times, January 8, 2012, “In the first six months of 2011, for example, 
the Super PAC operating on Romney’s behalf, Restore Our Future, reported corporate contributions of $1 million 
each from Eli Publishing Inc. and F8 LLC, both based in Provo, Utah. $250,000 from The Villages of Lake Sumter, 
Inc. in The Villages, Fla.; and $100,000 from 2GIG Technologies in Lehi, Utah.” 
41
 Lobbying and campaign finance can be both substitutes and complements, Professor Heather Gerken 
from Yale Law School suggests. After President Obama called for the Campaign Finance Reform, lobbyists became 
the key players in channeling funds from the lobbying industry to the2012 presidential election campaign (See 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/018727.html).  
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find that institutional (pension) trading has a positive impact on stock prices.
42
 Wu (2004) finds 
that CALPERS could have positive impacts on firms’ board structure and compel firms held by 
CALPERS to improve corporate governance. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) show that target 
firms are less likely to receive an acquisition bid, and acquisition firms have more bargaining 
power if they are held by long-term institutional investors. Cremers and Nair (2005) show that 
the public pension ownership is an effective proxy for a firm’s internal governance. Their 
findings suggest that long-term institutional investors could provide diligent monitoring and 
make a considerable commitment to corporate governance. State pension funds write their 
fiduciary duties like proxy voting into the chapters of their Public Acts, implying that the State 
pension funds attempt to implement their delegated monitoring role. Ashraf, Jayaraman, and 
Ryan (2012) find that pensions strongly influence mutual funds’ proxy voting on CEO 
compensation when mutual funds and pensions have business ties. I believe that either 
shareholders who want to maximize their wealth will encourage managers to engage in corporate 
political strategies that will build up political connections through campaign contributions or 
lobbying, or the managers who pursue their own interests are also likely to participate in these 
activities. 
43
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
Woidtke (2002) suggests that political influence might drive the negative impact of public pension 
ownership on stock prices.  
43
My results show that indeed state pension funds can help improve firm performance, but our sample firms 
selected by these state pension funds do not have positive contributions to fund performance compared to other 
firms (most likely non-local) held by state pension funds.  
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Chapter Nine: Data and Variables 
The information on equity holdings of state public pension funds is collected from the 13-
F reports filed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the period from 1999 to 
2009.
44
 I require my sample to have at least 20 consecutive quarterly reports for analysis 
purpose. My final sample consists of 16 state public funds which are defined benefit plans. I 
hand collect information on characteristics of board trustees from the annual financial reports 
published by these state public pension funds. I also collect other information on pension plans 
from Public Plans Database produced the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. My 
PAC contribution data and lobbying data are from the Center for Responsive Politics. Returns 
and accounting information of individual firms held by state pension funds are from CRSP and 
Compustat. Data on the Public Integrity Index is collected from the State Integrity Investigation 
Project sponsored by the Center for Public Integrity, Global Integrity, and PRI Public Radio 
International. Earnings surprises are estimated using data from Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (IBES). I collect macroeconomic variables using Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED) provided by the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis. I collect firms’ historical 
headquarter information before 2006 from Compact Disclosure, and for years after 2006, I use 
headquarter information provided by Compustat directly.   
  Table 1 provides summary statistics of the state pension funds for the last report every 
year. I have 668 fund-quarter observations at the fund level. The average number of firms held 
by these state pension funds is 1,611 in my sample. The average holding value per firm is $13.06 
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 The SEC requires funds with total assets greater than $100 million to file with them on a regular basis.  
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million whereas the median is $1.99 million. The average of the total assets computed as the 
aggregate value of equity holdings in a fund is about $21 billion. New York State Common 
Retirement Fund (NYCRF) is the largest with an aggregate equity portfolio of $47 billion, 
whereas Missouri State Employees Retirement Fund (MOERF) is the smallest with about $660 
million. The mean quarterly portfolio return is about 1.08%, and the median is 1.99%. On 
average, the trading returns earned by state pension fund managers is about -0.73%. The 
portfolio turnover is 0.12, which is relatively low compare to mutual fund turnover (see Carhart, 
1997; Chen, Jagadeesh, and Wermers, 2000). The price and the number of shares used to 
compute fund characteristics are split adjusted.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of State Public Pension Funds 
 
This table presents quarterly summary statistics of state public pension retirement systems. The Number of Firms is 
the number of firms held by the fund. Holding Value Per Firm is the holding value of a firm in the fund. Total 
Assets is the total assets of domestic equities invested by the fund. Portfolio Return is the quarterly value-weighted 
portfolio return for the fund. Trading Return is returns on buys minus forgone returns on sells assuming that trades 
are executed at each quarter end. Portfolio turnover is the sum of total buys and total sells minus net flows and then 
scaled by Total Assets.   
 
State Fund N 
The Number  of 
Firms 
Holding Value 
Per Firm              
($ Millions) 
Total Assets 
($ Billions) Portfolio Return Trading Return 
Portfolio 
Turnover 
       Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median  
CA CALPERS 44 2,882 3,405 7.09 0.65 20.37 6.91 1.66% 1.96% -1.54% -0.36% 0.16 0.13 
CA CALTRS 44 1,815 2,203 16.04 2.96 29.11 30.93 0.82% 2.04% 0.05% -0.55% 0.06 0.05 
CO COPER 44 2,067 2,317 6.00 1.09 12.39 12.36 1.00% 2.27% -1.12% -1.17% 0.15 0.10 
FL FLRS 44 2,338 2,422 13.06 1.58 30.53 30.95 0.69% 1.89% -0.81% -0.42% 0.06 0.04 
KY KYTRS 44 1,109 1,123 1.97 0.78 2.18 2.15 1.30% 2.79% -0.46% -0.53% 0.18 0.17 
MI  MIST 44 900 901 22.05 2.80 19.85 20.09 0.67% 1.58% -0.43% -0.27% 0.12 0.09 
MO MOERS 33 354 474 1.86 0.64 0.66 0.49 1.98% 2.60% -2.07% -1.99% 0.06 0.03 
NY NYCRF 44 1,620 1,749 29.13 7.25 47.17 47.01 0.87% 1.90% -1.24% -0.71% 0.10 0.09 
NY NYTRS 31 1,472 1,495 28.04 6.83 41.26 41.65 2.37% 2.40% -1.59% -1.00% 0.05 0.05 
OH OHPERS 42 2,567 2,750 9.86 1.33 25.32 25.90 0.43% 1.47% -0.13% -0.80% 0.10 0.10 
OH OHSTRS 43 2,112 2,085 10.83 1.52 22.87 22.92 0.78% 1.23% -0.88% -0.51% 0.17 0.14 
PA PAPSERS 37 1,988 2,153 6.73 2.45 13.37 15.18 1.22% 2.88% 0.16% -0.77% 0.15 0.13 
TX TXERS 44 830 863 8.93 2.06 7.41 7.45 0.44% 1.71% -0.74% -0.49% 0.12 0.10 
TX TXTRS 44 1,377 1,477 33.87 8.94 46.64 43.95 1.04% 2.09% -0.53% -0.56% 0.13 0.11 
VA VARS 43 1,175 1,156 4.34 1.29 5.10 4.11 0.63% 1.80% 0.17% 0.30% 0.14 0.13 
WI WIIB 43 905 872 12.77 3.30 11.55 11.33 1.93% 1.80% -0.91% -0.35% 0.19 0.16 
All Funds 668 1,611 1,491 13.06 1.99 21.03 17.81 1.08% 1.99% -0.73% -0.63% 0.12 0.10 
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Following studies like Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and Sinclair (2011), I construct two 
measures of local bias in general. The first measure (Ratio #1) is calculated as the ratio of the 
weight of local firms in the fund divided by the weight of local firms in the market portfolio 
minus one.  The second measure (Ratio #2) is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
the weight of local firms in the fund divided by the weight of local firms in the market portfolio. 
The first measure is a direct measure of local bias and the second one is a robust measure which 
accounts for the skewness in the ratio. I construct the measures of local contribution bias and 
local lobbying bias in a similar approach. The local contribution bias is the ratio of the weight of 
local firms that make contributions in the fund divided by the weight of local firms that make 
contributions in the market portfolio. The local lobbying bias is the ratio of the weight of local 
firms that lobby in the fund and the weight of local firms that lobby in the market portfolio.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of these different local bias measures. In my paper, I 
define a local firm as a firm headquartered in the same state as the fund state. My results show 
that on average 6.2% of the state pension funds are invested in local firms, whereas the weight of 
local firms in the market portfolio is 5.5%. The mean local bias is 0.26, and the median is 0.17. I 
find that state pension funds tend to overweight local firms that make PAC contributions by 23% 
and local firms that lobby by 17% compared with the market portfolio. The local bias measure 
and local political connection measure are positively and significantly correlated.
45
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 In my unreported analysis, the correlation between the dependent variables which are the political bias 
measures and some key independent variables like PAI, Public Integrity Index, or Congressional Connection is not 
highly correlated in either direction. This also implies that my results are not driven by the spurious or endogenous 
correlations of my measures.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Local Bias 
This table presents summary statistics of local bias in state public pension funds at the end of each year. Panel A 
presents different measures of local bias, and Panel B presents the correlations of different local bias measures. 
Local firms are defined as firms headquartered in the same state as the fund. Local contribution firms are local firms 
that make contributions to local politicians. Local firms lobbying are local firms that lobby. I first calculate the 
weight of local firms (local contribution firms or local firms lobbying) invested in a fund. I then compute the weight 
of all local firms (all local contribution firms or all local firms lobbying) in the market. Ratio #1, the first bias 
measure, is computed as the ratio of the weight of local firms in the fund over the weight of all local firms in the 
market minus one. Ratio #2, the second bias measure, is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the weight 
of local firms in the fund over the weight of all local firms in the market. P-values from the Pearson’s correlation are 
presented in parentheses.  
 
Panel A  Summary Statistics 
 
Local 
Firms 
Local  Contribution 
Firms 
Local Firms 
Lobbying Local Bias  
Local Contribution 
Bias  
Local Lobbying 
Bias 
 
% of 
Fund 
% of 
Market  
% of 
Fund 
% of 
Market  
% of 
Fund 
% of 
Market  
Ratio 
#1 
Ratio 
#2 
Ratio 
#1 
Ratio 
#2 
Ratio 
#1 
Ratio 
#2 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
   
 -1   
   
   
    
   
 -1   
   
   
    
   
 -1   
   
   
 
12/31/1999 6.07 5.52 2.56 2.64 3.07 3.35 0.57 0.27 0.34 -0.04 0.15 -0.04 
12/31/2000 5.55 5.19 2.61 2.71 2.82 3.24 0.39 0.17 0.34 0.13 0.31 0.05 
12/31/2001 5.65 4.87 2.56 2.60 2.79 3.07 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.02 0.16 0.00 
12/31/2002 5.19 4.64 2.78 2.72 2.98 3.01 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.01 
12/31/2003 6.60 5.60 3.41 3.15 3.87 3.64 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.10 
12/31/2004 6.47 5.40 3.43 3.13 3.84 3.54 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 
12/31/2005 6.52 5.52 3.44 3.07 4.13 3.69 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.07 
12/31/2006 6.30 5.57 3.57 3.15 4.15 3.78 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.09 
12/31/2007 6.91 5.82 4.50 3.40 5.11 4.10 0.36 0.27 0.38 0.30 0.31 0.25 
12/31/2008 6.56 6.04 4.35 3.60 4.97 4.09 0.22 0.14 0.34 0.24 0.29 0.20 
12/31/2009 6.64 6.01 4.24 3.34 4.89 4.05 0.21 0.08 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.09 
1999-2009 6.23 5.47 3.41 3.05 3.88 3.60 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.08 
Panel B Correlations of Different Bias Measures 
  
Local 
Bias #1 
Contribution 
Bias #1 
Lobbying 
Bias #1   
Local Bias 
#2 
Contribution 
Bias #2 
Lobbying 
Bias #2 
Local Bias #1 1.000   Local Bias #2 1.000   
          
Contribution Bias #1 0.563 1.000  Contribution Bias #2 0.488 1.000  
  (0.000)     (0.000)   
Lobbying Bias #1 0.647 0.874 1.000 Lobbying Bias #2 0.629 0.873 1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)  
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Chapter Ten: Empirical Analysis 
Local Firms’ Pre-holding and Holding Performance 
  In order to validate my political connection hypothesis, I analyze local firms’ one-year 
pre-holding and holding period performance by comparing local firms held by state pension 
funds with a sample of local benchmarks. I construct local benchmarks using an approach similar 
to that of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). I first group firms into 25 portfolios 
based on firm size and book-to-market ratio. Unlike Daniel et al (1997), I use industry instead of 
the momentum factor. I construct portfolios which contain both local benchmarks not held by 
state pension funds and local firms held by state pension funds. Because the length of the holding 
period for each firm can vary substantially, I run monthly time series regressions by applying a 
calendar time portfolio approach. I use the Fama-French three factor model and the Fama-French 
three factor model plus the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor to estimate alpha. The results 
presented in Table 3 are from the four factor model.  
From Table 3, I find that although non-politically connected local firms held by state 
pension funds underperform non-politically connected local benchmarks not held by these funds, 
their performance continues to fall during the holding period. So my evidence does not fully 
support the information advantage hypothesis.
46
 Next, my results show that politically connected 
local firms held by state pension funds do not exhibit better performance compared with non-
politically connected local firms held by state pension funds or compared with their politically 
connected local benchmarks not held by state pension funds before the holding period. During 
                                                          
46
 Brown et al. (2010) compares local firms held by state pension funds and non-local benchmarks not held 
by these funds. I take a different approach in my study.  
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the holding period, I see an improvement (from negative to positive) in the performance of 
politically connected local firms held by state pension funds even though they do not surpass 
their politically connected benchmarks not held by state pension funds. This provides some 
support for my political connection hypothesis. These politically connected local firms are not 
added to state pension funds by trustees because of their outstanding past performance, but their 
performance improves after being held by home-state pension funds. 
Table 3: Local Firms’ Pre-Holding and Holding Period Performance 
 
This table compares local firms held by state pension funds with their benchmarks not held by the funds. Benchmark 
firms are matched with firms held by state pension funds on size, book to market, and industry. Panel A presents 
results for the one-year pre-holding performance, Panel B presents results for holding period performance, Panel C 
presents the holding duration in quarters from the first buy to the last sell or the last report date in my sample period. 
I apply the monthly time-series Fama-French three factor model plus the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. The 
dependent variable is the value-weighted portfolio return. Contribution Firms are local firms that have made PAC 
contributions in the past election cycle. Firms Lobbying are local firms that have lobbied in the past year. I report 
annualized alphas (intercepts) and t-values (in parentheses) from time-series regressions after correcting for 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
Firms in 
Funds 
Benchmarks 
Not in Funds Firms in Funds 
Benchmarks 
Not in Funds 
Firms in 
Funds 
Benchmarks 
Not in Funds 
Contribution Firms No No Yes Yes No No 
Firms Lobbying No No No No Yes Yes 
Panel A One-Year Pre-holding Performance  
Alpha 0.0338 0.0707 -0.0384 0.0277 -0.0152 0.0602 
t (0.94) (1.29) (-0.70) (0.42) (-0.29) (0.95) 
R2 0.8769 0.8344 0.6731 0.5666 0.6779 0.6398 
Panel B Holding Period Performance 
Alpha -0.0112 -0.0190 0.0136 0.0139 0.0193 0.0320 
t (-0.62) (-0.59) (1.06) (0.75) (1.67) (1.66) 
R2 0.9559 0.9050 0.9594 0.9261 0.9719 0.9355 
Panel C Holding Duration in Quarters  
Mean 12.94  23.57  21.93  
Median  9.00  24.00  20.00  
Local Bias and State Public Pension Fund Performance 
   Brown et al (2010) find that local firms outperform non-local firms, implying that state 
pension funds have an information advantage about local stocks. If political connections play an 
important role in influencing state pension funds’ stock selection decisions, I expect that these 
political connected stocks have negative impact on fund performance. But if trustees of state 
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pension funds can gather some inside information about these politically connected firms 
through their social connections, I might see an opposite impact. Following a similar approach 
taken by Seasholes and Zhu (2010), I run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression clustered on 
quarter in the following model
47
: 
Portfolio Returnit = b0 + b1 *Local Biasit-1 (or Local Contribution Biasit-1 or Local Lobbying Biasit-1) + b2 * 
Portfolio Returnit-1 + b3 *Ln (Total Assets)it-1 + b4 *Trading Returnit-1 + b5 *Portfolio Turnoverit-1 
+ b6 *State GDP Growth Rateiy-1 + b7 *Corporate Net Income Taxesit-1 + b8 *Conviction Rateiy-1+ 
b9 *State Dependence on Government Spendingiy-1 + b10 *Union iy-1 + εit-1 (1) 
where Portfolio Return, local bias measures, Total Assets, and Portfolio Turnover are quarterly 
observations. State GDP Growth Rate, as a proxy for local economic growth, is the percentage 
change in state real GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Corporate Net Income 
Taxes is quarterly corporate net income taxes collected by a state divided by the total state tax 
revenues in the previous quarter.  
Conviction Rate is a proxy for the level of corruption in a state, defined as the number of 
convictions of state politicians divided by the total population (in millions) in a state in the 
previous year.
48
 State Dependence on Government Spending is calculated as the total sales of 
firms in industries that depend on government spending divided by the total sales of all industries 
in a state. Union, as constructed by Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001),
49
 is the percentage 
of non-agricultural employees who are union members in each state.  
 
                                                          
47
 As suggested by Thompson (2011), standard errors clustering on both firm and time are noisy if either 
dimension has very few clusters. I therefore cluster on quarter which has many more clusters than pension funds. 
Furthermore, I choose to estimate cluster corrected standard errors to allow for persistent common shocks within the 
fund, for example, the Public Integrity Index in my study. I also conduct robustness checks on whether this measure 
is efficient in Table 11.  
48
 The number of convictions is collected from the U.S. Department of Justice Public Integrity Section 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/). State population information is gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
49
  The union membership provided by Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001). The data includes private 
sector employees. As suggested by the 2012 data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, private sector union 
members only account for 6.6%. So I believe that this is still good proxy to estimate the impact of public section 
union membership.  
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Table 4: Local Bias and State Pension Fund Performance 
This table explains state pension fund performance with OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly 
value-weighted portfolio return for the fund. The different measures of local bias are as defined in Table 2. Lag 
(Portfolio Return) is the lagged portfolio return from the previous quarter. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm 
of total assets in the previous quarter. Trading Return is returns on buys minus forgone returns on sells assuming 
that trades are executed at each quarter end. Portfolio turnover is the sum of total buys and total sells minus net 
flows and then scaled by Total Assets in the previous quarter. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage 
change in seasonal adjusted CPI index.  Corporation Net Income Taxes is the ratio of corporation net income taxes 
over total tax revenues in a state. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians divided by state 
population in millions. State Dependence on Government Spending is calculated as the total sales of firms in 
industries that depend on government spending divided by total sales of all industries in a state. Union is the 
percentage of non-agriculture employees who are union members in each state.  t-values are presented below 
coefficients. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local Bias #1 
-0.007 
     (-0.79) 
     
Local Bias #2 
 
-0.012
    
 
(-1.54) 
    
Local Contribution Bias #1 
  
-0.016***
   
  
(-2.94) 
   
Local Contribution Bias #2 
   
-0.014*
  
   
(-1.92) 
  
Local Lobbying Bias #1 
    
-0.022***
 
    
(-4.25) 
 
Local Lobbying Bias #2 
     
-0.018**
     
(-2.52) 
Lag (Portfolio Return) 
0.049 0.055 0.041 0.046 0.044 0.048 
(0.33) (0.37) (0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
(-1.77) (-1.34) (-1.61) (-1.09) (-1.52) (-1.14) 
Trading Return 
0.336** 0.370** 0.339** 0.372** 0.347** 0.378** 
(2.02) (2.20) (2.03) (2.20) (2.11) (2.26) 
Portfolio Turnover 
-0.022 -0.023 -0.030 -0.033 -0.026 -0.031 
(-0.83) (-0.88) (-1.05) (-1.15) (-0.95) (-1.09) 
State GDP Growth Rate 
-0.431 -0.429 -0.457 -0.462 -0.458 -0.458 
(-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.07) (-1.06) 
Corporation Net Income Taxes 
0.241 0.248* 0.258* 0.240 0.253* 0.236 
(1.63) (1.67) (1.75) (1.59) (1.71) (1.57) 
Conviction Rate 
-0.019 0.039 0.067 0.099 0.034 0.088 
(-0.18) (0.41) (0.63) (0.89) (0.31) (0.84) 
State Dependence on Government 
Spending 
0.021 0.021 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.015 
(0.97) (1.03) (0.71) (0.80) (0.53) (0.75) 
Union 
-0.033 -0.027 -0.043 -0.045 -0.031 -0.033 
(-0.49) (-0.38) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.44) (-0.45) 
Intercept 
0.078* 0.069 0.075* 0.063 0.074* 0.065 
(1.87) (1.34) (1.80) (1.23) (1.76) (1.25) 
N 650 639 650 639 650 639 
R2 0.0592 0.0639 0.0646 0.0672 0.0714 0.0686 
Table 4 provides evidence that Local Bias has a negative effect on pension fund 
performance after I control for other fund and state characteristics; however, the impact is 
insignificant. Table 4 also shows that the politically connected equity portion of pension fund 
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investments has a significant and negative impact on pension fund performance. If Local 
Contribution Bias increases by one standard deviation, fund performance decreases by about 
0.83 basis points.  If Local Lobbying Bias increases by one standard deviation, the fund 
performance declines by about 1.2%. My results also show that large pension funds have poor 
performance. Portfolio Turnover, State GDP Growth Rate, Conviction Rate, and Union are 
insignificant in explaining pension fund performance.
50
 
State Political Characteristics and Local Bias 
Several studies such as Brown et al (2012) and Hochberg and Rauh (2013) show that the 
magnitude of corruption in a state is significant in explaining local bias.
51
 The policy and 
governance profiles can also be very different across states in the United States. The State 
Integrity Investigation Project (SIIP) provides an aggregate measure and also sub-measures of 
the public integrity based on evaluations on the effectiveness of policies or regulations in many 
areas like political financing, pension fund management, and ethics enforcement (see Appendix 
A3 for indicators about the sub-categories). The SIIP states, “The project’s final indicators assess 
the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key governance and anti-corruption 
mechanisms in the fifty states. They seek to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of the 
medicine applied against corruption in each state – openness, transparency, and accountability – 
rather than the disease of corruption itself.”52 
 
                                                          
50
 I collect the composition of board trustees from the annual financial reports published on the website by 
the retirement system of each state on its own website and test whether trustee characteristics impact fund 
performance in Appendix A3. Consistent with Useem and Mitchell (2000) and Harper (2008), my results don’t show 
that trustee characteristics are significantly related to fund performance. In details, I construct two variables, the 
percentage of elected trustees and the percentage of ex-officio trustees, and find that neither of them is significant in 
predicting fund performance. These results are presented in Appendix A3.  
51
 The common proxy for corruption used by these two studies is the conviction rate, which is the number 
of public officials  convicted of corruption divided by the population in a state.  
52
This website provides details on how the scores of public integrity are constructed:  
http://www.stateintegrity.org/methodology. 
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Table 5: Public Integrity and Local Bias in State Pension Funds 
 
This table provides summary statistics of local bias measures based on the public integrity score cards provided by 
the State Integrity Investigation Project. The overall grade of public integrity categories is used as the Public 
Integrity Index which measures a state’s policy and governance effectiveness from low to high. It is computed as the 
inverse of the aggregate public integrity ranks (from 1 to 50) of the fifty states. Political Financing Index and 
Pension Fund Management Index, and Ethics Enforcement Index, three other components of the integrity measures, 
are also constructed in a similar approach. Political Financing Index measures the effectiveness of state campaign 
financing policies. Pension Fund Management Index measures the effectiveness of state pension fund management 
policies. Ethics Enforcement Index measures the effectiveness of state ethics commission policies. Panels A through 
D provide average local bias ratios based on tercile groups of my four integrity indices separately. t-statistics are 
provided in the parentheses below the means.  
 
 
Local Bias Local Contribution Bias Local Lobbying Bias 
 
Ratio #1 Ratio #2 Ratio #1 Ratio #2 Ratio #1 Ratio #2 
Panel A Tercile Groups of Public Integrity Index 
1(low) 0.31 0.24 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.24 
 
(12.70) (14.19) (16.72) (19.09) (13.02) (14.73) ) 
2 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.20 0.06 
 
(7.14) (4.65) (6.83) (1.76) (5.71) (1.86) 
3(high) 0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 
 
(0.98) (5.23) (-1.65) (-2.30) (-1.36) (-1.72) 
Panel B Tercile Groups of Political Financing Integrity Index 
1(low) 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.22 
 
(6.06) (8.24) (6.66) (9.80) (5.05) (7.62) 
2 0.27 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.09 
 
(7.18) (5.82) (9.61) (3.32) (6.67) (4.11) 
3(high) 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.04 0.17 0.02 
 
(8.04) (6.27) (4.79) (0.71) (4.47) (0.35) 
Panel C Tercile Groups of Pension Fund Management Integrity Index 
1(low) 0.17 0.13 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.16 
 
(4.94) (5.22) (7.78) (7.50) (6.07) (5.30) 
2 0.47 0.28 0.23 0.14 0.27 0.17 
 
(7.04) (8.77) (8.69) (4.10) (5.77) (6.23) 
3(high) 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.02 0.13 0.01 
 
(9.38) (5.41) (5.41) (0.55) (4.59) (0.20) 
Panel D  Tercile Groups of Ethics Enforcement Integrity Index 
1(low) 0.27 0.18 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.20 
 
(9.86) (8.10) (14.17) (12.04) (11.61) (8.10) 
2 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.16 
 
(1.53) (6.10) (3.04) (10.77) (2.22) (8.26) 
3(high) 0.35 0.18 0.05 -0.11 0.11 -0.04 
 
(7.37) (6.04) (1.65) (-2.70) (2.82) (-1.09) 
I named the aggregate measure of public integrity as the Public Integrity Index, and the 
other three measures as Political Financing Integrity Index, Pension Fund Management Integrity 
Index, and Ethics Enforcement Integrity Index. To compute the indices, I take the inverse of the 
public integrity ranks of the fifty states in the U.S., so a higher index score indicates higher 
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integrity.
53
 Table 5 provides univariate analysis of the relation between local bias measures and 
public integrity indices. I find that the extent of political connection biases is stronger for states 
with all public integrity indices, and the pattern is clear and monotonic. However, for Local Bias, 
I do not observe a monotonic pattern in the relation between Pension Fund Management 
Integrity Index and Ethics Enforcement Integrity Index. These findings together suggest that 
local bias of politically connected stocks is stronger when state governance and regulation 
mechanisms are less effective. 
I next conduct multivariate analysis on the relation between local biases and political 
factors, governance and anti-corruption mechanisms, and board characteristics. I profile the 
political characteristics in a state with the following measures: Public Integrity Index, Politician 
Turnover Rate and Political Homophily between local politicians and citizens.
54
 Below is my 
model: 
Local Bias Measuresit = b0+ b1 *Public Integrity Indexi+ b2 *Politician Turnover Rateiy-1   + b3 *Political 
Homophilyit-1 + b4 *Conviction Rateiy-1 +b5 *Corporation Net Income Taxesit-1+b6 *Ln (Total 
Assets) it-1   + b7 *State GDP Growth Rateiy-1 + b8 *Unioniy-1 + εit-1     (2) 
where the Public Integrity Index is as described in the previous sessions. I expect a negative 
relation between the Public Integrity Index and local biases. Politician Turnover Rate is 
computed as the percentage of newly elected senators, representatives, and governors in a state. I 
expect that local bias is stronger for states with higher politician turnover rate because local firms 
with lower information asymmetry might be a safety net for these new politicians or because 
these new politicians need to return the favor they have received from local politically connected 
firms during their election. 
                                                          
53
The original rank is one for the state with the highest integrity scores, and the rank is fifty for the lowest. 
54
 I appreciate Jungchul Park’s willingness to share data on Conviction Rate and Political Homophily. 
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  Another important variable I use is Political Homophily, which is the inverse of the 
ideology distance between the state governments and their citizens.
55
 The higher the homophily 
measure is, the stronger the tie between state politicians and citizens in that state. For states with 
high political homophily, state politicians are more likely to work for their local citizens’ 
interests in terms of launching new policies and legislation. In this case, I expect Political 
Homophily to be negative in predicting local bias. However, firms’ political activities might 
disalign the interests between local politicians and their citizens, leading to politicians working 
for the interests of local firms. For this scenario, I expect a positive relation between Political 
Homophily and political connection bias. 
  Consistent with previous studies, I expect the coefficient of Conviction Rate to be 
positive. I don’t have a clear prediction for the sign of State GDP Growth Rate.56 Nevertheless, I 
do not hypothesize a positive relation between State GDP Growth Rate and political connection 
bias measures if political connection is an important driver in local bias but not the economic 
performance of the industries in that area. Union is union density measured at the state level. 
Local labor unions, which represent state workers’ rights, are more likely to protect local 
industries. I expect Union to be positively related to Local Bias. Union members are big 
supporters of politicians, thus I also expect the coefficient of Union to be positive.  
  Table 6 presents my findings from OLS regressions on different measures of local bias. 
Consistent with my predictions, I find that Public Integrity Index is negatively related to Local 
Bias. In states with high public integrity, state pension funds tend to invest less in local firms 
perhaps in consideration of the overall fund performance. Consistent with Brown et al. (2012) 
                                                          
55
 Prof. Richard Fording’s website at the University of Kentucky provides the information on ideology 
scores: http://www.uky.edu/~rford/stateideology.html.  
56
 For example, some pension funds might invest in local firms with poor performance to support local 
economy.  
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and Hochberg and Rauh (2013), local bias (Local Bias #2) is higher in more corrupt states as 
measured by Conviction Rate. Corporate Net Income Taxes are significant, so state pension 
funds are more likely to support local firms that can generate more tax revenues in their states. 
Political Homohily is negative but almost insignificant in explaining Local Bias. Both Politician 
Turnover Rate and State GDP Growth Rate are insignificant, thus local fundamentals are not the 
reason for the over-allocation of home-state firms in state pension funds.  
 Table 6: Factors That Explain Local Bias at the State Level 
 
This table shows OLS regressions on state-level factors that affect local bias of state public pension funds. The 
dependent variable is different measures of local bias as defined in Table 2. Public Integrity Index measures a state’s 
effectiveness on governance and anti-corruption mechanisms from low to high. Politician Turnover Rate is the 
turnover rate of state politicians including senators, representatives, and governors. Political Homophily is the 
inverse of the distance of political ideology between government officials and state citizens. Conviction Rate is the 
number of convictions of politicians divided by state population in millions. Corporation Net Income Taxes is the 
ratio of corporation net income taxes over total tax revenues in a state. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in the previous quarter. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage change in seasonal adjusted CPI 
index. Union is the percentage of non-agriculture employees who are union members in each state. t-values are 
presented below coefficients. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Local Bias 
#1 
Local Bias 
#2 
Local 
Contribution 
Bias #1 
Local 
Contribution 
Bias #2 
Local 
Lobbying 
Bias #1 
Local 
Lobbying 
Bias #2 
Public Integrity Index 
-1.338*** -0.628*** -1.729*** -1.794*** -1.497*** -1.417*** 
(-7.22) (-5.25) (-6.00) (-6.22) (-5.09) (-5.22) 
Politician Turnover Rate 
-0.120 0.004 -0.024 0.045 -0.035 -0.060 
(-0.97) (0.05) (-0.26) (0.53) (-0.35) (-0.64) 
Political Homophily 
-0.376* -0.158 -0.881*** -0.500*** -0.672*** -0.400** 
(-1.75) (-1.17) (-4.06) (-2.66) (-2.84) (-2.01) 
Conviction Rate 
-0.191 1.795*** 4.627*** 5.225*** 2.263** 3.679*** 
(-0.14) (3.03) (4.42) (4.84) (2.13) (4.33) 
Corporation Net Income Taxes 
3.892*** 2.853*** 4.403*** 3.615*** 3.185*** 2.533*** 
(7.09) (6.79) (7.13) (6.54) (6.32) (5.55) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.028 -0.071*** 0.019 0.025 0.017 -0.007 
(-1.09) (-4.56) (0.85) (1.63) (0.79) (-0.44) 
State GDP Growth Rate 
0.247 -0.244 -2.264*** -3.117*** -1.946*** -2.314*** 
(0.34) (-0.44) (-3.90) (-3.59) (-3.02) (-3.01) 
Union 
1.532*** 1.580*** -0.162 -0.079 0.590* 0.733*** 
(4.07) (7.39) (-0.58) (-0.26) (1.83) (2.87) 
Intercept 
1.899* 1.178** 3.839*** 2.007** 2.893*** 1.799** 
(1.79) (2.06) (3.72) (2.45) (2.63) (2.09) 
N 668 657 668 657 668 657 
R2 0.1083 0.1794 0.1821 0.1655 0.1266 0.1503 
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  From the models to predict Local Contribution Bias and Local Lobbying Bias, I find that 
the Public Integrity Index is significantly negative, which is consistent with my hypothesis. 
When state governance and regulation mechanisms are more effective, there is substantially less 
overweighting of politically connected local firms. Political Homophily is negatively and 
significantly related to local political connection biases, implying that if there is strong ideology 
alignment between local politicians and state citizens, firms’ corporate political strategies are 
less effective in buying local politicians’ favor. My results also show that for more corrupt states 
(with a higher Conviction Rate), state pension funds are more likely to hold more shares of firms 
headquartered in states. Local economic growth (State GDP Growth Rate) in the previous period 
is negatively related to local political connection biases. Union is not significant in explaining 
Local Contribution Bias but is positively related to Local Lobbying Bias.  
Political Networks and Local bias 
  I hypothesize that if local politicians are more influential in the Congress and thus can 
pass bills or legislation that are more likely to benefit the local economy and local businesses, the 
extent of local bias will increase. I use Congressional Connection, which is the connectedness 
measure constructed by Fowler (2006)
57
 as a proxy for local politicians’ power in Congress and 
examine the impact of political networks on local bias in a model similar to Equation (2). 
  From Table 7, I see that Congressional Connection is significantly related to local bias, 
but there is also a strong and positive impact on local political connection biases. This finding 
has two implications. One is that influential politicians in the Congressional network might be 
able to help pass more bills that will benefit firms in their homes states, and state public pension 
funds might invest in these firms for their future growth opportunities. The second is that 
                                                          
57
 I collect information on cosponsorship networks from James Fowler’s website, 
http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.htm.  The Congressional Connection is constructed as an average of the 
connectedness measures of local politicians in a state.   
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influential politicians might be able to use their power to impose pressure on pension trustees to 
return favors to politically connected local firms because these firms have provided financial 
support to politicians. Public Integrity Index remains negative and significant after we control for 
congressional connections.  
Table 7: Political Connections and Local Bias 
 
This table shows OLS regressions of political connections on local bias of state public pension funds. The dependent 
variable is different measures of local bias as defined in Table 2. Congressional Connection is the connectedness 
measure constructed by Fowler (2006). Public Integrity Index measures a state’s effectiveness on governance and 
anti-corruption mechanisms from low to high. Politician Turnover Rate is the turnover rate of state politicians 
including senators, representatives, and governors. Political Homophily is the inverse of the distance of political 
ideology between government officials and state citizens. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of 
politicians divided by state population in millions. Corporation Net Income Taxes is the ratio of corporation net 
income taxes over total tax revenues in a state. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in the 
previous quarter. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage change in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Union is 
the percentage of non-agriculture employees who are union members in each state. t-values are presented below 
coefficients. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Local Bias 
#1 
Local Bias 
#2 
Local 
Contribution 
Bias #1 
Local 
Contribution 
Bias #2 
Local 
Lobbying 
Bias #1 
Local 
Lobbying 
Bias #2 
Congressional Connection 1.254*** 0.722*** 0.953** 1.108** 1.414*** 1.027** 
 
(3.92) (2.80) (2.06) (2.41) (3.62) (2.10) 
Public Integrity Index 
-1.155*** -0.243 -2.381*** -2.229*** -1.927*** -1.751*** 
(-3.56) (-1.02) (-4.88) (-4.89) (-5.14) (-5.52) 
Politician Turnover Rate 
-0.306 -0.150 0.0561 0.175 -0.0293 -0.0783 
(-1.29) (-1.03) (0.30) (1.19) (-0.14) (-0.47) 
Political Homophily 
-0.927*** -0.353* -1.608*** -0.888*** -1.484*** -0.936*** 
(-3.87) (-1.69) (-7.49) (-3.33) (-8.66) (-4.07) 
Conviction Rate 
-3.733*** 0.908 4.714*** 7.428*** 0.632 4.343*** 
(-3.01) (1.24) (2.87) (4.61) (0.48) (3.47) 
Corporation Net Income Taxes 
4.057*** 2.676*** 4.444*** 2.972*** 2.428*** 1.605*** 
(5.36) (5.37) (4.49) (3.56) (3.56) (2.91) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.007 -0.028 0.024 0.074*** 0.043** 0.043** 
(-0.27) (-1.48) (1.27) (5.90) (2.50) (2.46) 
State GDP Growth Rate 
2.133* -0.191 -2.525*** -4.822*** -2.101*** -3.379*** 
(1.67) (-0.28) (-3.80) (-4.28) (-3.10) (-4.48) 
Union 
2.519*** 2.090*** -0.565 -0.571 0.818** 0.682** 
(5.35) (7.78) (-1.48) (-1.30) (2.17) (2.53) 
Intercept 
3.756*** 1.407 6.844*** 3.034** 5.981*** 3.509*** 
(3.00) (1.58) (6.52) (2.50) (7.59) (3.36) 
N 423 417 423 417 423 417 
R2 0.1936 0.2299 0.274 0.2531 0.2343 0.2566 
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Trustee Characteristics and Local Bias 
Even though certain trustee characteristics related to board composition cannot explain 
fund performance after I control for many other factors as can be seen from my results in 
Appendix A3 and other studies like Useem and Mitchell (2000), Harper (2008), I explore 
whether the composition of trustees is related to the portfolio allocation characteristics in state 
pension funds. I hand collect the composition of board trustees from the annual financial reports 
published on the website by the retirement system of each state and construct these two 
variables, Elected Trustees and Ex-officio Trustees where Selected Trustees is the percentage of 
trustees elected by state employees from various organizations and Ex-officio Trustees is the 
percentage of ex-officio trustees who have important positions like state treasurer, state 
comptroller, or even the governor.  
I expect the coefficient of Elected Trustees to be negative and Ex-officio Trustees to be 
positive in the prediction of over-allocation of politically connected local firms by state pension 
funds because elected trustees serve the interests of state employees or retirees and the majority 
of ex-officio trustees, maybe politicians too, work for the governor and are under the pressure 
from local politicians.
58
 In my unreported tests, I find that the correlation between Elected 
Trustees and Ex-officio Trustees is -78%, so I test these two variables separately in my 
regressions presented in Table 8. The models I use follow Equation (2) but Corporate Net 
Income Taxes is excluded because this variable has relatively high correlation with several other 
variables in my smaller sample.  
                                                          
58
 Ex-officio members for few states are superintendent of public instructions which are non-partisan 
positions.  Though the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College provides the number of trustees who are 
also plan participants, I find that the information related to the number of trustees in their survey is less accurate than  
the board information from the annual financial report published by each retirement system on its own website. 
Therefore, I use my hand-collected information about board composition instead although these reports don’t 
provide the number of trustees who are also plan participants.  
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Table 8: Trustee Characteristics and Local Bias 
This table shows OLS regressions of trustee characteristics that affect local bias of state public pension funds. The 
dependent variable is different measures of local bias as defined in Table 2. Elected Trustees is the percentage of 
board trustees elected by state employees or retirees.  Ex-officio Trustees is the percentage of ex-officio members on 
the board. Public Integrity Index measures a state’s effectiveness on governance and anti-corruption mechanisms 
from low to high. Politician Turnover Rate is the turnover rate of state politicians including senators, representatives, 
and governors. Political Homophily is the inverse of the distance of political ideology between government officials 
and state citizens. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians divided by state population in 
millions. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in the previous quarter. State GDP growth rate is 
the annual percentage change in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Union is the percentage of non-agriculture employees 
who are union members in each state.  t-values are presented below coefficients. Standard Errors are cluster-
corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Local Bias 
#1 
Local Contribution Bias 
#1 
Local Lobbying Bias 
#1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elected Trustees 
-0.228*** 
 
-0.198** 
 
-0.191** 
 (-2.85) 
 
(-2.35) 
 
(-2.35) 
 
Ex-officio Trustees 
 
0.012 
 
0.248*** 
 
0.164*** 
 
(0.29) 
 
(5.34) 
 
(3.40) 
Public Integrity Index 
-1.430*** -1.344*** -1.269*** -1.227*** -1.252*** -1.201*** 
(-4.61) (-4.82) (-4.56) (-4.74) (-3.65) (-3.77) 
Politician Turnover Rate 
-0.104 -0.113 -0.028 -0.058 -0.039 -0.061 
(-0.72) (-0.75) (-0.30) (-0.60) (-0.38) (-0.57) 
Political Homophily 
0.302 0.307 0.302 0.365 0.003 0.045 
(1.07) (1.02) (1.42) (1.85) (0.01) (0.17) 
Conviction Rate 
-2.728 -2.916 4.289*** 3.480** 0.875 0.299 
(-1.48) (-1.58) (3.49) (2.56) (0.52) (0.17) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
0.019 0.020 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.051* 0.046* 
(0.69) (0.72) (4.10) (3.67) (1.97) (1.83) 
State GDP Growth Rate 
1.178 1.361 -0.485 -0.166 -0.545 -0.289 
(1.00) (1.06) (-0.67) (-0.23) (-0.57) (-0.30) 
Union 
2.640*** 2.804*** 1.380*** 1.170*** 1.747*** 1.656*** 
(5.63) (5.50) (5.31) (4.55) (4.91) (4.24) 
Intercept 
-1.380 -1.534 -2.013* -2.330** -0.342 -0.590 
(-0.98) (-1.03) (-1.94) (-2.49) (-0.25) (-0.46) 
N 471 471 471 471 471 471 
R2 0.1141 0.105 0.1641 0.1803 0.1058 0.1067 
We test the first local bias measures for brevity. The first column in Table 8 shows that 
for retirement systems with a larger percentage of elected trustees elected by state employees 
(Elected Trustees), there is less overweighting of home-state firms. Column (2) shows that the 
percentage of ex-officio trustees is insignificant in predicting Local Bias. Next, in regressions on 
Local Contribution Bias and Local Lobbying Bias, the coefficient of Elected Trustees is negative 
and significant, implying that if the elected trustees represent the interests of state employees or 
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retirees who are more concerned about the performance of the fund, they are less likely to be the 
big voters to invest in politically connected firms, particularly those with poor performance in 
the pre-holding period as shown in Table 3.  However, Ex-officio Trustees is positively and 
significantly related to local political connection biases. It suggests that ex-officio trustees, 
perhaps under political pressure, favor local firms who are supportive to home-state politicians.  
State Pension Funds’ Holding Decisions of Local Firms 
In this section, I examine the possible firm-level factors that influence pension funds’ 
asset allocation decisions of these local firms. Local firms have less information asymmetry to 
local investors, but why poor-performing local firms compared with their benchmarks are more 
likely to be included in the pension fund portfolio? My explanation is that pension managers 
show preferences for some local firms over others because of potential political benefits. I use 
the probit model to conduct my test with a sample that includes all Compustat local firms (local 
to the state pension fund) with available information to construct the variables I need. I consider 
commonly used factors in previous studies plus the two proxies I take for political connections. 
My model takes the following form: 
HTHLDDUMit = b0 + b1 *HTCONTRDUMiy-1(or HTLOBDUMiy-1) + b2 *SUEPOSit-1 + b3*PYRRETiy-1   
+ b4 *TURNOVERit-1 + b5 *LNMKTCAPit-1 + b6 *LNAGEiy-1 + b7 *ROAit-1 + b8 *LNMBit-1 + b9 * 
DEBT RATIOit-1 + b10 *SPDUMit-1   +b11 *Inverse Mills Ratio + εit-1 (3)  
 
where HTHLDDUM is a dummy which is one if a local firm is held by a state pension fund in a 
quarter and zero otherwise where a local firm is defined as a firm that is headquartered in the 
public pension fund state. HTCONTRDUM is set to one if a local firm has made PAC 
contributions to local politicians in the past election cycle and zero otherwise. HTLOBDUM is a 
dummy set to one if a local firm lobbied in the past quarter and zero otherwise. SUEPOS is a 
dummy which is one if earnings surprise estimated using a random walk model is positive and 
zero otherwise. PYRRET is the buy and hold return in the past year. TURNOVER is average 
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turnover computed using daily volume information in the past quarter. LNMKTCAP is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization. LNAGE is the logarithm of age. ROA is net income over total 
assets. LNMB is the natural logarithm of the ratio of market equity to book equity. DEBT RATIO 
is the ratio of long-term debt plus current debt over total assets. SPDUM is a dummy which is 
one if a firm is an S&P 500 firm and zero otherwise. Following Petersen (2009) and Thompson 
(2011), I correct standard errors in my model by clustering on time. I also include the Inverse 
Mills Ratio from the models in Appendix A4 to control for selection bias due to unobserved 
factors that are not captured in my model.  
 I expect the coefficients of HTCONTRDUM and HTLOBDUM to be positive and that 
politically connected local firms are more likely to be included in the state pension funds 
compared with other firms. I predict that firms with large size, long existence, and good past 
performance, high turnover, and high growth opportunities are the attention grabbing firms and 
are thus more likely to be selected by the state pension funds. I also predict that local firms with 
fewer attention grabbing factors can also influence investors’ holding decision through corporate 
political strategies, so small local firms should be more likely to be held by a state pension fund 
if they have political connections with the politicians in a state.  
My results in Table 9 provide evidence for my conjecture. As predicted, after controlling 
for S&P 500 firms, the two proxies for political connections are positively related to the 
likelihood of a firm to be held by a state pension fund, so political connection plays an important 
role in explaining pension fund asset allocation decisions. The signs of other variables like 
SUEPOS, PYRRET, LNMKTCAP, and DEBT RATIO are also consistent with my expectations. It 
is not a surprise to see that S&P firms are positive and significant. The interaction term of 
political connection proxies and firm size is negative and significant after I conduct the 
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correction as suggested by Ai and  Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). It confirms 
my hypothesis that small firms can buy investors’ attention if they have political ties. 
Table 9: State Pension Funds’ Holding Decisions of Local Firms 
 
This table presents the results from probit models used to predict the probability for a local firm to be held by a state 
public pension fund after controlling for selection bias. The dependent variable is one if a local firm is held by a 
state pension fund and zero otherwise. LOCALDUM is set to one if a firm is headquartered in the pension fund’s 
state and zero otherwise. HTCONTRDUM is set to one if a local firm makes contributions to local politicians in the 
pension fund’s state in year t-1 and zero otherwise. HTLOBDUM is set to one if a local firm lobbies in year t-1 and 
zero otherwise. SUEPOS is set to one if earnings surprise estimated using seasonal random walk is positive in 
quarter q-1 and zero otherwise. PYRRET is the previous one year return. TURNOVER is the average monthly share 
turnover in previous quarter calculated as trading volume over shares outstanding. LNMKTCAP is the logarithm of 
market capitalization in quarter q-1. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of firm age.  ROA is net income over total 
current assets in quarter q-1. LNMB is the natural logarithm of market equity to book equity ratio in quarter q-1. 
DEBT RATIO is the sum of long-term debt and current debt over total assets in quarter q-1. SPDUM is one if a firm 
is an S&P 500 firm and zero otherwise. CONIMR is the inverse mills ratio from the probit model to predict a firm’s 
propensity to make PAC contributions. LOBIMR is the inverse mills ratio from the probit model to predict a firm’s 
propensity to lobby. p-values are reported as below. Standard errors are cluster corrected on quarter.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
HTCONTRDUM 0.893 0.000 0.922 0.000 
    HTLOBDUM 
    
0.566 0.000 0.397 0.000 
SUEPOS 0.346 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.300 0.000 
PYRRET 0.191 0.003 0.128 0.094 0.191 0.003 0.155 0.138 
TURNOVER -0.098 0.006 -0.118 0.004 -0.096 0.007 -0.106 0.048 
LNMKTCAP 0.027 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.036 0.000 
LNAGE 0.110 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.011 0.189 
ROA -0.742 0.000 -0.579 0.000 -0.722 0.000 -0.561 0.000 
LNMB 0.009 0.715 0.037 0.261 0.008 0.751 0.113 0.000 
DEBT RATIO -0.767 0.000 -0.764 0.000 -0.770 0.000 -0.704 0.000 
SPDUM 0.548 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.486 0.000 0.533 0.000 
HTCONTRDUM*LNSIZE -0.125 0.000 -0.136 0.000 
    HTLOBDUM*LNSIZE 
    
-0.070 0.000 -0.053 0.001 
CONIMR 
  
0.008 0.649 
    Intercept -2.650 0.000 -2.419 0.000 -2.633 0.000 -1.993 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.2295 
 
0.2311 
 
0.2294 
 
0.1956 
 N 79505 
 
61056 
 
79505 
 
45655 
 
Corrected Interaction  Effect based on Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004)  
Interaction Term  -0.025 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.013 
 Z-value (-4.74) 
 
(-4.94) 
 
(-1.94) 
 
(-2.38) 
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Table 10: State Pension Funds’ Holding Decisions of Non-Local Firms 
 
This table presents probit regressions to predict the probability for a non-local firm to be held by a state public 
pension fund. The dependent variable is one if a non-local firm is held by a state pension fund and zero otherwise. 
CONDUM is set to one if a non-local firm makes contributions to the politicians in the pension fund’s state in year 
t-1 and zero otherwise. LOBDUM is set to one if a non-local firm lobbies in year t-1 and zero otherwise. SUEPOS is 
set to one if earnings surprise estimated using seasonal random walk is positive in quarter q-1 and zero otherwise. 
PYRRET is the previous one year return. TURNOVER is the average monthly share turnover in previous quarter 
calculated as trading volume over shares outstanding. LNMKTCAP is the logarithm of market capitalization in 
quarter q-1. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of firm age.  ROA is net income over total current assets in quarter q-1. 
LNMB is logarithm of market equity to book equity ratio in quarter q-1. DEBT RATIO is the sum of long-term debt 
and current debt over total assets in quarter q-1. SPDUM is one if a firm is an S&P 500 firms and zero otherwise. 
CONIMR is the inverse mills ratio from the probit model to predict a firm’s propensity to make PAC contributions. 
LOBIMR is the inverse mills ratio from the probit model to predict a firm’s propensity to lobby. p-values are 
reported as below. Standard errors are cluster corrected on quarter. 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
CONDUM 0.999 0.000 0.687 0.011 
    LOBDUM 
    
1.066 0.000 0.547 0.000 
SUEPOS 0.440 0.000 0.221 0.087 0.440 0.000 0.331 0.107 
PYRRET -0.087 0.024 -0.107 0.018 -0.085 0.027 -0.114 0.057 
TURNOVER 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.006 0.019 0.001 0.035 0.001 
LNMKTCAP 0.334 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.391 0.000 
LNAGE 0.300 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.301 0.000 0.231 0.000 
ROA -0.137 0.003 -0.069 0.423 -0.119 0.005 0.132 0.392 
LNMB -0.055 0.048 -0.103 0.048 -0.062 0.025 0.013 0.792 
DEBT RATIO -0.272 0.000 -0.482 0.000 -0.255 0.000 -0.365 0.000 
SPDUM -0.071 0.534 -0.489 0.000 -0.013 0.919 -0.589 0.000 
CONDUM*LNSIZE -0.111 0.006 -0.147 0.000 
    LOBDUM*LNSIZE 
    
-0.132 0.000 -0.120 0.000 
CONIMR 
  
0.140 0.000 
    LOBIMR 
      
0.079 0.038 
Intercept -2.309 0.000 -2.470 0.000 -2.342 0.000 -1.816 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.213 
 
0.275 
 
0.215 
 
0.215 
 N 103749 
 
73364 
 
103749 
 
51262 
 
Corrected Interaction  Effect based on Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) 
Interaction Term -0.039 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.021 
 Z-Value -4.040 
 
-1.070 
 
-6.980 
 
-2.030 
 
Because firms might self-select to make PAC contributions or engage in lobbying 
activities, Model 1 and Model 3 in Table 8 might suffer self-selection bias. In order to address 
this problem, I apply a two stage least squares (2SLS) model. In the first stage, I use a probit 
model to estimate the probability for a firm to make PAC contributions or lobby and compute the 
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Inverse Mills Ratio. As seen in Appendix A4, the structure of the probit model on PAC 
contributions follows Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) with slight modification.
59
 I run 
the probit model year by year to avoid looking-forward bias. In the second stage, I include the 
inverse Mills ratio as a control for self-selection bias. In Model 2 and Model 3, I use inverse 
mills ratio from the second stage as a control. I find that my results still hold after I control for 
self-selection bias.  
State Pension Funds’ Holding Decisions of Non-Local Firms 
Do non-local firms benefit from being politically connected? Many state pension funds 
still hold a large portion of non-local firms in their portfolios. There are many reasons, such as 
diversification and profit opportunities, local investors may hold non-local stocks. Local 
investors are more cautious in investing in non-local stocks compared with local stocks because 
of information asymmetry. If non-local firms consider the role institutions play as important, 
they may want to commit to political involvement in order to buy state pension funds’ attention. 
In Table 10, I conduct a similar analysis as in Table 9 and find that for the non-local firms, the 
probability of being selected into a state pension fund is higher if they lobby or if they make 
PAC contributions to the politicians in a state. I also find that political connection can help small 
firms in influencing pension fund managers’ stock selection decisions. The signs of the other 
variables remain consistent.  
Local Bias and the Underfunding of State Pension Funds 
In this section, I raise questions that may concern most tax payers and current or future 
retirees. What is the real economic impact of local bias? Does local bias contribute to the 
underfunding status of public pension funds? Many state pension funds are underfunded, which 
                                                          
59
 I exclude sales and the number of employees because these two variables are highly correlated with a 
firm’s market capitalization.  
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means that the total liabilities of these funds are greater than their total assets and the fund is 
inadequate to cover the current or future retirees’ pension payments. The underfunding status of 
state pension funds is related to many factors such as interest rates, unemployment status, and 
economic growth prospects. The public also blames poor governance by pension trustees for 
underfunding. Buying campaign support by promising pension benefits might be another cause. 
  In Table 11, I conduct an analysis of the factors that may drive the underfunding status of 
state pension funds. The dependent variable is the underfunding ratio computed as the ratio of a 
retirement plan’s total actuarial liabilities divided by total actuarial assets minus one.60 The main 
independent variables in this analysis are the different local bias measures. I find that Local Bias 
is negatively related to the underfunding status of state pension funds, suggesting it is not a bad 
thing to invest in local firms. However, the Local Contribution Bias and the Local Lobbying Bias 
are positively related to the underfunding of pension funds, suggesting that political connections 
are detrimental to the funding status of state pension funds. The underfunded ratio increases by 
about 1.6% (0.030 x 0.52) when Local Contribution Bias (Ratio #1) increases by one standard 
deviation and increases by about 2.2 % (0.042 x 0.53) when Local Lobbying Bias increases by 
one standard deviation. This implies that for a pension fund with $50 billion of total actuarial 
assets, one standard deviation increase in the Local Lobbying Bias measure, the underfunded 
portion of the plan increases by about $1.1 billion ($50 billion x 2.2%).  
  Discount Rate is negative but insignificant, which suggests that discount rates provided 
by state pension funds are not reliable in estimating the funding status of state pension funds. For  
 
                                                          
60
 The information on the pension plans’ total actuarial assets and total actuarial liabilities is collected from 
Public Plans Database at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. The total actuarial assets here 
include all investments made by state pension plans including domestic equities, private equities, bonds, and so on. 
So the total assets here are different from the total assets, which are total equity assets, presented in the Table 1. I 
only use the total aggregate assets to compute the funding levels.  
95 
 
  Table 11: Factors that explain the funding level of state pension funds 
This table analyzes factors that affect the funding level of state public pension funds. The dependent variable is the 
underfunded ratio of a plan, which is computed as the ratio of the total actuarial liabilities of a retirement system 
over the total actuarial assets of the plan and then minus one. The different measures of local bias are as defined in 
Table 2. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in the previous quarter. Discount Rate is the 
investment return assumption provided by retirement plans. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage change 
in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Corporation Net Income Taxes is the ratio of corporation net income taxes over total 
tax revenues in a state. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians divided by state population in 
millions. State Dependence on Government Spending is calculated as the total sales of firms in industries that 
depend on government spending divided by total sales of all industries in a state. Union is the percentage of non-
agriculture employees who are union members in each state. t-values are presented below coefficients. Standard 
Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local Bias #1 -0.007 
     
 
(-0.56) 
     Local Bias #2 
 
-0.017 
    
  
(-0.94) 
    Local Contribution Bias #1 
  
0.030** 
   
   
(2.41) 
   Local Contribution Bias #2 
   
0.024*** 
  
    
(2.65) 
  Local Lobbying Bias #1 
    
0.042*** 
 
     
(2.94) 
 Local Lobbying Bias #2 
     
0.050*** 
      
(5.27) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.025*** -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.037*** 
 
(-9.47) (-6.98) (-11.22) (-7.67) (-11.35) (-8.11) 
Discount Rate -1.941 -1.402 -0.706 -0.586 -0.428 -0.150 
 
(-1.03) (-0.74) (-0.34) (-0.29) (-0.22) (-0.08) 
State GDP Growth Rate -2.036*** -1.932*** -1.946*** -1.891*** -1.884*** -1.839*** 
 
(-7.75) (-7.60) (-7.63) (-7.50) (-7.47) (-7.24) 
Corporation Net Income Taxes 0.951*** 0.902*** 0.897*** 0.870*** 0.859*** 0.840*** 
 
(3.49) (3.22) (3.27) (3.07) (3.11) (2.97) 
Conviction Rate 0.377 0.349 0.254 0.232 0.268 0.176 
 
(1.11) (1.06) (0.81) (0.73) (0.81) (0.54) 
Union -0.519*** -0.445*** -0.528*** -0.474*** -0.528*** -0.485*** 
 
(-4.46) (-4.82) (-4.60) (-4.77) (-4.62) (-4.86) 
Intercept 0.636*** 0.691*** 0.558** 0.630*** 0.541** 0.600*** 
 
(4.15) (4.56) (3.44) (4.16) (3.51) (4.04) 
N 471 460 471 460 471 460 
R2 0.1783 0.1895 0.1831 0.1913 0.1886 0.1999 
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states with better local economic outlook, the underfunding level is lower. For states that are 
collecting more taxes from corporations, the underfunded ratio is greater, possibly due to the 
large number of employees in the states or due to the need to collect more taxes to reduce the 
state budget deficit. In more corrupt states, the underfunded ratio is larger. Union is negative and 
significant, so union members are diligently monitoring the performance of their retirement 
funds.  
Table 12: Robustness Checks on the Measure of Public Integrity  
 
This table replicates Table 6 and Table 7 using a new measure of Public Integrity. The dependent variable is the first 
measure of local bias as defined in Table 2. Congressional Connection is the connectedness measure constructed by 
Fowler (2006). New Public Integrity Index is Public Integrity Index multiplied by the number of bills passed in a 
state for a given quarter. Politician Turnover Rate is the turnover rate of state politicians including senators, 
representatives, and governors. Political Homophily is the inverse of the distance of political ideology between 
government officials and state citizens. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians divided by state 
population in millions. Corporation Net Income Taxes is the ratio of corporation net income taxes over total tax 
revenues in a state. Ln (Total Assets)q-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets in the previous quarter. State GDP 
growth rate is the annual percentage change in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Union is the percentage of non-
agriculture employees who are union members in each state. t-values are presented below coefficients. Standard 
Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Local Bias Local Contribution Bias Local Lobbying Bias 
 
#1 #1 #1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Congressional Connection 
 
1.163*** 
 
1.083*** 
 
1.374** 
 
(5.45) 
 
(2.90) 
 
(3.26) 
New Public Integrity Index 
-0.054*** -0.059*** -0.055*** -0.099*** -0.050*** -0.090*** 
(-7.09) (-5.05) (-4.34) (-5.75) (-3.71) (-6.55) 
Politician Turnover Rate 
-0.151 -0.210 -0.061 0.166 -0.055 0.100 
(-1.11) (-0.84) (-0.57) (0.78) (-0.48) (0.44) 
Political Homophily 
-0.515** -0.996*** -1.031*** -1.661*** -0.892*** -1.568*** 
(-2.32) (-4.49) (-4.54) (-7.45) (-3.93) (-9.16) 
Conviction Rate 
-1.767 -3.876** 4.510*** 5.001*** 1.670 0.598 
(-1.38) (-3.60) (3.84) (3.21) (1.45) (0.50) 
Corporation Net Income Taxes 
3.919*** 3.900*** 3.886*** 3.839*** 2.835*** 2.067*** 
(7.46) (5.96) (6.38) (4.81) (5.42) (3.49) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.010 0.001 0.041** 0.042** 0.041** 0.056*** 
(-0.38) (0.02) (2.02) (2.36) (2.03) (3.29) 
State GDP Growth Rate 
-0.205 2.227* -2.939*** -2.482*** -2.885*** -1.998** 
(-0.24) (1.78) (-3.74) (-3.05) (-3.80) (-2.47) 
Union 
1.544*** 2.557*** -0.333 -0.483 0.376 0.882** 
(3.76) (5.46) (-1.07) (-1.17) (1.11) (2.20) 
Intercept 
2.390** 3.980*** 4.334*** 6.796*** 3.726*** 6.176*** 
(2.21) (3.65) (4.01) (6.66) (3.57) (8.08) 
N 621 423 621 423 621 423 
R2 0.1262 0.1964 0.1799 0.2718 0.1371 0.1371 
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Robustness Checks 
 The State Integrity Investigation project started in 2011 and ended in 2012, so using the 
public integrity index in my analysis might suffer looking-forward bias. To address this problem, 
I propose a new measure of public integrity index, New Public Integrity Index, which is the 
original measure of public integrity index multiplied by the number of bills that become law in a 
quarter where the bills are introduced by legislators in a given state. If there is any change in a 
state’s legislative effectiveness, the number of bills that become law will be different over time.61 
As seen in Table 12, the new measure of public integrity index is also negative and significant in 
explaining local bias in state pension funds after including a time variant component which 
proxies the change in the policy or regulation effectiveness in a given state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61
 I collect the bills information from the website of Congressional Bills Project.  
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Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 
Local bias in state pension fund investments has been observed by several studies. Some 
studies find local stocks held by state pension funds underperform non-local stocks while others 
find that local holding stocks outperform non-local benchmarks. My study suggests although 
local bias does not have a negative impact on overall fund performance, the overweighting of 
politically connected stocks drives down pension fund performance significantly while we 
control for many other factors such as the size of the fund, state economic status, corruption, et 
cetera. This finding cannot be explained by the information advantage hypothesis. Local political 
connection bias also contributes to the underfunding status of state pension funds.  
I find that local bias in state pension funds can be explained by state political 
characteristics and regulation policy effectiveness. My analyses show that in states with lower 
Public Integrity scores, the local political connection bias is stronger. But the impact of 
regulation policy effectiveness on local political connection bias becomes positive when the local 
politicians’ congressional connectedness comes in. My explanation is that local politicians might 
be supporting firms that support them and my evidence suggests that for state pension funds with 
a higher percent of ex-officio trustees, local political connection bias is stronger but for funds 
with a higher percent of elected trustees, there is weaker local bias. Furthermore, I conduct an 
analysis at the firm level and find that a firm’s connection with local politicians can influence the 
state pension fund’s holding decision. 
My study contributes to the literature in explaining local biases and under-diversification 
of local investors’ investments and implies that state political and governance characteristics can 
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explain local bias. My work sheds lights on the relation between political networks, part of the 
social networks, and behavioral biases.  
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Appendix A1: Description of State Pension Fund 
 
STATE NMSHORT Full Name Sample Period 
Separate 
Investment 
Counsel 
CA CALPERS California Public Employees Retirement System 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 Yes 
CA CALTRS California State Teachers Retirement System 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
CO COPER Public Employees Retirement Association of Colorado  03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
FL FLRS State Board of Administration of Florida Retirement System 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
KY KYTRS Teachers Retirement System of The State of Kentucky 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
MI  MIST State Treasurer State of Michigan  03/31/1999-12/31/2009 Yes 
MO MOERS Missouri State Employees Retirement System  03/31/1999-03/31/2007 No 
NY NYCRF New York State Common Retirement Fund 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
NY NYTRS New York State Teachers Retirement System 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
OH OHPERS Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio  06/30/1999-12/31/2009 No 
OH OHSTRS State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
PA PAPSERS Pennsylvania Public School EMPLS RETRMT SYS 12/31/2000-12/31/2009 No 
TX TXERS Employees Retirement System of Texas 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
TX TXTRS Teacher Retirement System of Texas 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
VA VARS Virginia Retirement Systems Et Al  06/30/1999-12/31/2009 No 
WI WIIB State of Wisconsin Investment Board 03/31/1999-12/31/2009 No 
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Appendix A2: Trustee Characteristics and Fund Performance 
 
This table presents the test of trustee characteristics on state pension fund performance. The dependent variable is 
the quarterly value-weighted portfolio return for the fund. The different measures of local bias are as defined in 
Table 2. Elected Trustees is the percentage of trustees elected by state employees on the board. Ex-officio Trustees 
is the percentage of ex-officio members on the board. Lag (Portfolio Return) is the lagged portfolio return from the 
previous quarter. Ln (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in the previous quarter. Trading Return is 
returns on buys minus forgone returns on sells assuming that trades are executed at each quarter end. Portfolio 
turnover is the sum of total buys and total sells minus net flows and then scaled by Total Assets in the previous 
quarter. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage change in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Conviction Rate is 
the number of convictions of politicians divided by state population in millions. State Dependence on Government 
Spending is calculated as the total sales of firms in industries that depend on government spending divided by total 
sales of all industries in a state. Union is the percentage of non-agriculture employees who are union members in 
each state.  t-values are presented below coefficients. Standard Errors are cluster-corrected on quarter. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elected Trustees -0.006 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.009 
 
 
(-0.64) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-0.87) 
 Ex-officio Trustees 
 
-0.002 
 
0.004 
 
0.002 
  
(-0.32) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.33) 
Local Bias #1 -0.010 -0.010 
    
 
(-1.07) (-1.01) 
    Local Contribution Bias #1 
  
-0.033*** -0.033*** 
  
   
(-3.90) (-3.89) 
  Local Lobbying Bias #1 
    
-0.031*** -0.030*** 
     
(-4.79) (-4.73) 
Lag (Portfolio Return) 0.023 0.023 -0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.014 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (-0.03) (-0.02) (0.08) (0.09) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-1.65) (-1.58) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-1.17) (-1.16) 
Trading Return 0.399** 0.397** 0.399** 0.398** 0.408** 0.406** 
 
(2.27) (2.25) (2.26) (2.26) (2.35) (2.34) 
Portfolio Turnover -0.031 -0.034 -0.059 -0.060 -0.036 -0.039 
 
(-0.65) (-0.74) (-1.23) (-1.27) (-0.77) (-0.84) 
State GDP Growth Rate 0.017 0.022 0.012 0.018 0.006 0.012 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Conviction Rate -0.293* -0.295** -0.135 -0.151 -0.248 -0.260 
 
(-1.94) (-2.00) (-0.81) (-0.92) (-1.50) (-1.60) 
State Dependence on Government 
Spending -0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 
 
(-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.64) (-0.60) 
Union 0.085 0.093 0.089* 0.092* 0.100* 0.105* 
 
(1.50) (1.56) (1.69) (1.68) (1.87) (1.90) 
Intercept 0.070 0.066 0.052 0.048 0.059 0.055 
 
(1.47) (1.41) (1.13) (1.06) (1.25) (1.18) 
N 466 466 466 466 466 466 
R2 0.0533 0.053 0.0729 0.0724 0.0791 0.0784 
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Appendix A3: Indicators of the State Integrity Investigation Project 
 
This table provides the indicators used to construct the investigation categories of the public integrity index. This 
information below is provided by the State Integrity Investigation, which is a project conducted by the Center for 
Public Integrity, Global Integrity, and PRI Public Radio International.  
 
Investigation Categories # Indicators  
Political Financing 
1 Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties? 
2 Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates? 
3 Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective? 
4 Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates effective? 
5 Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties? 
6 Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' campaigns? 
State Pension Fund 
Management 
1 
Are there laws and regulations requiring that state-run pension funds be managed 
transparently? 
2 
Are the laws and regulations requiring that state-run pension funds be managed transparently 
effective? 
3 
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or the 
management of the state run pension funds? 
4 
In practice, regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or the 
management of the state-run pension funds are effective? 
Ethics Enforcement  
1 
Are there laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics enforcement agency 
(or set of agencies)? 
2 
Are the laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics enforcement agency 
(or set of agencies) effective? 
3 Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement agencies? 
4 Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement agencies effective? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A4 Structure of the probit model  
 
 This table provides the structure of the probit model to produce inverse Mills Ratio used to control for self-
selection bias. PACDUM is set to one if a firm makes political campaign contributions to the politicians in year t  
and zero otherwise. LOBDUM is set to one if a firm lobbies in year t and zero otherwise. RELINDPAC is the 
number of Political Action Committees scaled by the number of firms in an industry by the first two-digit historical 
SIC codes from Compustat. RELINDLOB is the number of lobbying firms scaled by the number of firms in an 
industry by the first two-digit historical SIC codes from Compustat. PCTMEM is the percentage of employees who 
are also union members in an industry. RELGOVSALE is firms’ sales to U.S. government scaled by total sales to all 
customers. Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians scaled by state population in millions. 
CAPITALDUM is a dummy which is one if a firm's headquarter is located at the state capital and zero otherwise 
where firms’ historical headquarters are collected from Compact Disclosure. REGDUM is a dummy which is one 
for financial firms (SIC codes 60-69) or utility firms (SIC codes 40-49) and zero otherwise. MKTSHR is a firm's 
sales scaled by total industry sales. HHI_SALES is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index computed with sales 
information where industry groups take the first two-digit historical SIC codes from Compustat. LNAGE is the 
logarithm of firm age. LNBUSSEG is the logarithm of the number of business segments. LNMKTCAP is the 
logarithm of market capitalization. LNMB is logarithm of market equity to book equity ratio. DEBT RATIO is the 
sum of long-term debt and current debt over total assets. FCF is firms’ free cash flows divided by total assets.  
Variable Names PAC Contributions  Lobbying 
Dependent Variable  
  PACDUM  YES   
LOBDUM   YES 
Independent Variable      
RELINDPAC YES   
PCTMEM YES  
RELGOVSALE YES YES 
CONVICTION RATE   YES 
CAPITALDUM 
 
YES 
RELINDLOB   YES 
REGDUM YES  YES 
MKTSHR YES YES 
HHI_SALES  YES YES 
LNAGE YES YES 
LNBUSSEG YES YES 
LNGEOSEG YES YES 
LNMKTCAP YES YES 
LNMB YES YES 
DEBTRATIO YES YES 
FCF YES YES 
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Appendix A5: Correlations 
 
Congressional Connection is the connectedness measure constructed by Fowler (2006). Public Integrity Index, 
which measures a state’s effectiveness on governance and anti-corruption mechanisms from low to high. Politician 
Turnover Rate is the turnover rate of state politicians including senators, representatives, and governors. Political 
Homophily is the inverse of the distance of political ideology between government officials and state citizens. 
Conviction Rate is the number of convictions of politicians scaled by state population in millions. Corporation Net 
Income Taxes is the ratio of corporation net income taxes over total tax revenues in a state. Ln (Total Assets)q-1 is 
the natural logarithm of total assets in the previous quarter. State GDP growth rate is the annual percentage change 
in seasonal adjusted CPI index. Union is the percentage of non-agriculture employees who are union members in 
each state.  
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Congressional Connection 1 
       
 
Public Integrity Index -0.378 1 
      
 
Politician Turnover Rate 0.105 0.175 1 
     
 
Political Homophily -0.202 0.048 0.166 1 
    
 
Conviction Rate -0.163 -0.254 -0.018 -0.057 1 
   
 
Corporation Net Income Taxes -0.032 0.409 0.054 -0.023 -0.076 1 
  
 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.328 0.015 -0.161 -0.113 -0.077 0.159 1 
 
 
State GDP Growth Rate -0.094 0.146 0.016 0.056 -0.093 -0.046 0.078 1  
Union -0.055 0.150 -0.031 -0.180 -0.158 0.520 0.289 -0.306 1 
 
 
 
 
